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For over 4 00 years the Muslim people of the southern
Philippines have been at war. They have resisted the Spanish
occupation of their ancestral homelands, the American colon-
ial presence, and the current Christian government.
To understand what motivates the Moro people to such con-
flict, it is necessary to study their history, religion, and
the ethnic fabric which makes up their various regional
groups.
The fundamentals of their religion require a homogenous
Islamic government. In the Philippines this would require
separation, or at least total autonomy for the Muslim areas.
This has never been allowed by the Christian government
which has perpetuated the cause of the Moro insurgency.
Conflict will surely continue as long as Christian authority
is imposed upon the Moro people.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For over four hundred years the people of the Southern
Philippines have been divided and at war with one another.
The essential division between some of them has centered on
religion with Islam opposing Christianity. Other factors
have exacerbated their fundamental conflicts.
The Islamic people of the Southern Philippines are
generally referred to as "Moros." Their homeland covers an
aggregate area of 45,000 square miles including the islands
of the Sulu Archipelago, Palawan, Basilan, and portions of
Mindanao.
Until the late 1970s, eighty percent of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) were dedicated to suppressing the
insurgency in the south. As late as 1981 there were twelve
2AFP batallions serving in the area. Currently, (1984) six
batallions remain along with two batallions of military
police. There are also 64,000 indigenous non-Muslim
personnel of the Civilian Home Defense Force who are armed
3
and technically controlled by the AFP. The Muslims are
presently fielding approximately 16,000 armed combatants
4by government estimates. During the 1970s there were as
many as 30,000 Islamic warriors actively fighting in full
time service to their cause.
The cost in lives and suffering has been significant.
President Ferdinand Marcos estimated in 1977 that the
7
conflict had produced 500,000 refugees. There were 100,000
lives lost in battle; 500 AFP soldiers died in 1982 alone.
This study seeks to gain an understanding of the ethnic
make-up of the Moro people, their history, religion, and the
factors spurring such a long term and seemingly unreconcil-
able confict. An understanding of the causes of conflict
may suggest ways and means to reduce the bloodshed and suf-
fering, with resulting benefits to U.S. interests in the
Philippines.


































II. REGIONAL GROUPS OF THE SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES
One of the basic errors made when dealing with the
Filipino Muslims has been the tendency to think of them as
only one people whereas there are several distinct regional
groups of Moros. This chapter is an analysis of the Moro
people and their ethnic characteristics.
A. MAGUINDANAO
The largest group of Moros is the Maguindanao. As of
1978, they numbered approximately 730,000 or about two percent
of the population, primarily located in the provinces of
Cotabato on Mindanao. " A short distance to the north are two
other closely related Muslim groups: the Maranao, around Lake
Lanao, and the Iranon, who live along the coast of Illana Bay.
The Maguindanao, meaning people of the flood plain,
inhabit the Pulangi and Rio Grande de Mindanao River basins
which are a mass of marshlands interconnected with severely
winding waterways. Earlier in history they settled on the
banks of the many rivers and streams and on the higher ground
in and around the marshes. The two largest settlements are
Cotabato City and Dulawan (or Datu Piang)
.
The Maguindaneo have a common language. They have also
had common social and political institutions, dress and orna-
mentation, and the religion of Islam. They have absorbed
other groups of neighboring people who would share the
12
acceptance of their socio-political organization and their
belief -in Sunni Islam.
Outward symbols of the Maguindanao can still be ob-
served. The men typically have shaved heads or very close
cut hair. Their heads are normally covered in public with
a kerchief or turban which may be topped with a woven hat.
Some men still wear the tubular wrap-around skirt. In the
past, members of the elite could be identified by a certain
type of curved hat and, especially, an ivory-handled gold
8
and silver decorated kris (curved sword)
.
In Maguindanao communities, there can usually be found
large wooden houses (or long houses) which may be inhabited
by one large extended family or several related families.
Communal use of land and resources is common. Early in
their history, the primary form of cultivation was a crude
form of "slash and burn." Their traditional foods were
rice, tubers, sago, and recently, corn, supplemented by
9
coconuts and a large variety of fruit. Chickens and goats
were raised and fish were harvested from the rivers and
marshes. Some spices were grown as well as coffee, betel
nut, cacao and tobacco. Recently the plow and harrow method
of wet rice farming has replaced the old slash and burn
method of food production.
As with most Malay cultures, their pre-Muslim religion
was based on animism. The process of conversion to Islam
is cloaked in legends of dubious veracity.
13
The most commonly accepted legends attribute the
Maguindanao' s conversion to Sarip Kabungsuwan, a Muslim
Prince of Johore (Malay Peninsula) who claimed to be a
direct descendant of the prophet Mohammed. According to
the legend, Kabungsuwan first set foot on Mindanao around
1500 A.D. with a small group of Sama warriors. So strong
was his wisdom, personality, and the appeal of his mes-
sage of Islam, that he won all of his converts peace-
11
fully. Both Maranao and Maguindanao elite families
12trace their genealogical lines back to Sarip Kabungsuwan.
The legend says that the Malay prince assumed the
local title of datu (chieftan) , which, at that time, was
the highest rank that could be held. His successors how-
ever, became known as sultans who were in turn advised
and supported by a council of datus known as the Ruma
Bechara. One of the primary functions of the Ruma
Bechara was to choose the heir to the sultan. It was
common for key military and civilian positions to be held
by relatives of the sultan. The decisions of the Ruma
Bechara were therefore of great political, social, and
13
economic interest to many who aspired to leadership.
The Islamic conversion of the Maguindanao spurred
their rapid expansion early in the sixteenth century.
Their power expanded to the point that they controlled
most of the trade between the sea coast and the interior
regions of Mindanao and virtually dominated most of the
14
southern part of the island from Zambianga to Davao.
The Muslims of the lowlands extracted tribute and taxes
from the pagan tribes in the hills and used these tribes
as a source of slaves.
When the Spanish came to the Philippines in 1565,
they clashed immediately with the Maguindanao, but were
never able to subdue their Moro enemies.
The American conflict with the Maguindanao ended in
1"905 when their leader, Datu Ali of Cota Bato, was
defeated. After his defeat the primary efforts of the
American, and subsequently the Philippine government, was
to integrate the Maguindanao with the rest of the nation
politically and to encourage resettlement in Cotabato by
14
non-Muslim Filipinos.
The social organization of the Maguindanao is unique
in that it has a system of social rank known as maratabat
(a sociopsychological value involving pride, honor, self-
esteem, face, and rank) . The amount or degree of
maratabat that is accorded an individual depends directly
on heritage, with those most directly linked to
Kabungsuwan given the highest rank of datu . The sultan
was then chosen from among the datus . The next lower
rank is dumatu (lesser noble) . Next are the sakop who
are followers or freemen. Lowest in rank are the
ulipun who are freemen that have been indentured for
crimes or debts. Below, and not included in the overall
15
social rank system, are the banyaga (slaves) who pro-
vided an important base for the Maguindanao society
during traditional times.
Among the Maguindanao orthodox Islam has been mixed
with folklore. Especially in rural areas there is only
very limited practice of Islamic rituals and obligations
and the fundamental teachings of Islam are only super-
ficially and imperfectly understood. The formal Islamic
beliefs of the villagers are commonly coexistent with
strong ancient beliefs in environmental spirits. Magic
rituals and healing ceremonies are still quite common.
According to legend, Sarip Kabungsuwan possessed mirac-
ulous powers of magic and healing. Often times these
beliefs are perpetuated by the local religious leaders,
known as panditas
,
who conduct religious ceremonies and
attempt to give a rudimentary understanding of the
Qur'an to the people. Lately, with a closer affiliation
with primary Muslim institutions and nations outside of
the Philippines, and increased interest in orthodox
Islamic beliefs and practices has resulted in a corres-
ponding reduction in the belief of magic. Many new
mosques and madrassas (Islamic schools) have been con-
structed in Cotabato recently for the formal religious
IS
education of Muslim youth.
In the recent past the home region of the Maguindanao,
(Cotabato) , has been divided into several provinces in
16
order to provide more jobs for government officials. The
Maguindanao are subject to special laws which apply only to
Muslim Filipinos. These laws allow them to maintain some of
their cultural traditions, more notably the practices of
polygamy and divorce.
The overall economic development in the Muslim areas of
the Cotabato provinces has been very minimal. The Muslims
attribute this shortfall to government preference for
development in Christian majority areas. Non-Muslims tend
to blame the current situation on what they see as the back-
ward and archaic social and political systems to which
traditional Muslims tend to adhere. These systems favor a
few of higher rank and ignore the needs of the masses. The
datus have lost a great deal of power due to the increasing
influx of non-Muslims into the area. As the numerical
balance has shifted to the Christians* favor it is becoming
increasingly rare to see a datu elected to provincial or
national office, unless he has the blessing of Malacanang.
B . MARANAO
The maranao, which means People of the Lake, are pre-
dominantly situated around Lake Lanao in the northwest por-
tion of the island of Mindanao. The Maranao language is
distinct from, but somewhat similar to the Maguindanao.
The Iranon, known alternately as the Iranum, Illanun, or
Ilanon, live in and around Balabagan, which is southwest of
Lake Lanao on the coast of Illano Bay.
17
The Maranao are racially related to the Malay and
Indonesian peoples as are most Filipinos. Consequently,
they are physically indistinguishable from the majority of
their countrymen.
The lake from which the Maranao derive their name, Lake
Lanao, is the second largest fresh water lake in the
Philippines and is approximately 2,300 feet above sea level;
It is fed by a multitude of small mountain streams and
empties into the Agus River. The southern tip of the lake
is approximately 21 miles from the city of Malabang on the
southwestern coast of Mindanao. The Maranao are, therefore,
predominantly an inland group, traditionally isolated from
coastal influences and colonial powers. The mountainous
terrain between the coast and the lake has provided a
natural boundary which has helped isolate the Maranao from
outside influence. Recently, a cement road between Marawi
City and Iligan City, as well as other improved transporta-
tion means, has ruined their isolation.
Of the many Muslim groups in the southern Philippines,
the Maranao were the last to be converted to the Islamic
faith. The Maranao numbered about 205,000 in 1977, which
numerically ranks them as the second largest Muslim group
in the Philippines, About 90 percent of them live in the
Lanao del Sur province with the remaining 10 percent
living in Lanao del Norte as well as portions of Cotabato,
IS
Zamboanga del Sur, and Bukidnon.
18
The predominant occupations of the Maranao are farming
and fresh water fishing. The eastern side of Lake Lanao is
a fertile rice growing area. At the present time govern-
ment officials are attempting to introduce new irrigation
techniques and seed varieties which, it is estimated, could
triple the rice production of the area. In other areas of
Lanao the rich soil, plentiful rainfall, and mild climate
allows the production of a surplus of corn, peanuts, sweet
potatoes, coffee, citrus fruits, and exotic tropical fruits,
Farming methods are not ^ery advanced, so the usual diffi-
culties with soil exhaustion and pests exist.
The Maranao 's other economic endeavors include such
various forms of cottage industry as cloth and mat weaving,
wood carving, and metal work in brass, silver, and gold.
Maranao merchants eke out a living by traveling throughout
the Philippines selling their wares.
The primary city of the Maranao is Marawi, which was
formerly known as Dansalan. This city, located in the
northern tip of Lake Lanao, is their commercial, cultural,
and educational center. In 1970 its population was about
50,000, making it the largest city in Lanao del Sur as well
19
as its provincial capital. The Maranao commonly travel
from their homes around the lake to Marawi to trade or sell
products at the market in return for clothes, household
utensils, farm tools, and those items not available in the
rural areas and villages.
19
The Maranao cultural values are based on the principles
of clan relationships, hospitality, and maratabat
, and the
basic precepts of the Islamic religion.
The typical village is comprised of multiple related
households. Several of these families may live together in
a single structure or may join together in a food-sharing
co-operative. The traditional housing structure has no par-
titions inside. Sleeping areas are situated along the walls
with an aisle down the center of the structure. Each
family occupies one sleeping area which will usually have a
kapok mattress, straw mats, embroidered pillows, and a
cloth canopy, which serves as suspension for a mosquito
net. Toward the rear of the house is a common kitchen area
which is shared by all of the occupants. All the residents
of a housing structure, or long house, are usually related.
These relationships are carefully recorded in each indi-
vidual ' sgeneology, This heavy emphasis on family history
20promotes a strong feeling of kinship.
Many of the Maranao folk arts also help strengthen these
family ties. They are typically practised at large
gatherings to commemorate such special occasions as marriage,
death, or unique individual achievements. Such gatherings
usually call for a feast at which there may be the chanting
of the individual's geneology, the playing of various
musical instruments, singing of folk tunes, and the playing
of games and dancing.
20
A Maranao may be a member of several villages simultane-
ously, because membership is based on kinship not residency.
Kinship is passed down from both maternal and paternal
lines. This, added to the tendency to marry outside of their
immediate clan group, further complicates the individual's
duties and requirements of clanship. Although it is possible
to have membership in more than one village because of kin-
ship, it is also possible to live within the territory of a
village and not be a member due to lack of proper lineage.
To the Maranao the village unit is a grouping of individuals
who share common lineage rather than a place or land area.
The rights and duties imposed upon an individual are
directly related to his family line, however, his personal
ranking and ultimate prestige in the overall society is pre-
dominantly determined by acquired skills, such as reader of
the Qur'an, interpreter of Islamic law, or public speaker.
Also important is his ability as a village leader to settle
disputes, effect revenge for insults or the killing of a
close relative, and to exhibit brave conduct in battle.
These personal skills and attributes can easily outweigh low
ranking heritage for a talented individual.
The form of Islam practiced by the Maranao is of the
Shafi school. It shows evidence of a strong Sufi influence,
primarily due to key words used by them as well as some group
chants at religious ceremonies. The pre-Islamic beliefs and
practices dealing with agriculture, the cycles of nature,
21
and the spirit world are more noticeable in rural areas than
in urban centers. The Islamic beliefs of the Maranao tare
strongly influenced by the Arab world because of Arab
teachers who lived among them and due to a small but highly
regarded group of young men and women who have traveled to
the Middle East to study Islamic subjects. These individuals
commonly teach in the local madrassa upon their return. As a
result of Arab influence as well as pressure from the
Philippine government and private enterprise, the folklore of
the Maranao is gradually, but steadily, changing. They have
become increasingly sensitive to the criticism directed to-
ward them by both Muslim and non-Muslim groups and indivi-
duals accusing them of not being in line with orthodox
islamic principles. The outcome of this tension has been a
growing rift between the traditional and modern ways of
21development. The Maranao were very much opposed to the
restrictions forced upon them by the Christian Filipino
administration during the martial law period.
The Maranao preference seems to be for a federated sys-
tem of government which they feel would give them an oppor-
tunity to become more autonomous. Lacking this they would
like a total secession from the republic in order to become
a truly Islamic state. Due to their overwhelming loyalty to
kinsmen, they are quick to shelter and hide armed rebels
from government persecution even if they might personally
disagree with their cause. The rebels are commonly referred
22to as "the children" by the Maranao.
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C. SAMA
The Sama ethnic group is the most widely dispersed in
Southeast Asia. Spread over an area of greater than 1.25
million square miles, the Sama are found from Borneo to the
Moluccas and from the northern tip of the Philipp-ines to
southern Indonesia.
The largest group of Sama, numbering some 203,000, are
the Suluan Samal, found in the Sulu Archipelago and along
24the coasts of southwestern Mindanao and eastern Sabah.
Thanks to their numbers, they have the greatest strength and
the greatest economic influence among the Sama people.
Their settlements commonly take the form of closely
spaced homes located on small expanses of well-protected
shoreline. They have tended to build their homes directly
over tidal shallows. In other locations the Sama villages
are constructed on the beach front or immediately adjacent
to it. Most of the homes are built on pillars providing
three to six feet of clearance underneath. The construction
materials used are dependent on the relative wealth of the
owner. The most inexpensive domiciles are constructed
using framing materials of mangrove, split bamboo flooring,
and walls and roof of thatch. They enclose about 400 square
feet of living space, all within one room. The more expen-
sive and lavish home is normally constructed of commercially
obtained sheet lumber and corrugated metal roofing. This
type of home may have several partitioned sleeping areas, a
25porch, and a separate cooking area.
23
The social organization of the Sama is based on the
individual family unit which consists of a married couple and
any dependent offspring. It is not uncommon to see an..
elderly parent or older sibling residing within this unit.
The large extended family also exists among the. Sama. Al-
though the basic unit is the nuclear family, it is common to
see Sama moving about within their extended family on a
temporary basis.
The next division within a community of households is
that of a tumpuk or residence cluster. Tumpuks usually are
composed of households physically situated close together.
The households within the tumpuk are also commonly geneo-
logically related. Each of these clusters will acknowledge
one individual from within its residents as its leader.
Several of these tumpuks will attend a single mosque. This
larger grouping is known as a parish and will also have
chosen a leader from among those within it. The leader of
the parish is commonly the owner or sponsor of the mosque
and becomes the leader in political and legal matters. A
larger community may contain several parishes from which is
chosen a headman from among their leaders to serve as the
leader for the community as a whole.
The primary source of income for most Sama families
(except the Yakan) is provided by fishing.
The cutting and drying of firewood from mangrove and
the collection of tidal food plants and animals,, as well as
24
seaweed or agar-agar are common examples of supplemental
income producing activities. Probably the most profitable
activity is in copra production and is seen as a more
desirable alternative to fishing. There are comparatively
few members engaged in copra as a primary occupation, how-
ever, due to the need of capital for investment.
An interesting aspect of the Sama culture is the co-
operative relationship that has been developed with the
inland groups. The Sama produce an abundance of protein
foods from fishing, but they do not produce sufficient
quantities of starch. The inland groups produce an abundance
of rice and root crops, but very little animal protein. The
arrangments that have evolved are of obvious benefit to both,
however, the Sama have also managed to reap political profit
from the situation. Their near monopoly on fish production
over the centuries has given them security options against
the more powerful, both politically and militarily, peoples
of the adjacent inland areas. The traditional Muslim system
of determining political power was based on land ownership.
The Sama have never controlled large amounts of land because
of their maritime economic base. This did give them a
mobility that was not available to the inland groups, who
were involved in many intergroup conflicts over territory.
The Sama could easily trade with whomever they pleased to
obtain food starch while all the inland groups were reliant
on the Sama for animal protein.
25
D. YAKAN
The Yakan of the southern Philippines live predominantly
in the interior of the island of Basilan. With a population
of 97,000, this group of Sama are all of the Sunni sect of
Islam following the Shafi school. Although they were
probably the original inhabitants of Basilan, they now com-
prise less than one-half the population and their percent-
ages continue to decline. The towns of Isabela and Lamitan,
as 'well as the immediate surrounding area, contain the
majority of Christian Filipinos, while the Tausug and Sama
2 fi
are primarily found in the coastal villages.
Basilan is located just off the southern tip of
Mindanao. It has a volcanic origin and is presently 495
square miles in area. The interior of the island is
mountainous in places with some table lands and rolling
hills that are arable.
The Yakan are largely occupied with farming on their
individually owned fields. The crop most often grown is
upland rice, supplemented by camote and cassava. Yakan men
and women typically work side by side in the fields to plant,
weed, and harvest the crops. However, it is strictly the
males' job to cut and burn off the fields at the completion
of a harvest and then to plow it in preparation for the next
crop.
These are people of the fields and therefore have formed
no compact villages. Their homes are scattered among the
26
fields and are usually rectangular and built on piles.
They have wooden or bamboo walls and a very steep thatched
roof. Except for the cooking area, which may be partitioned
off, the typical home has only one room plus a porch. Al-
though the Yakan are all Muslim, they make no special
arrangements or closed quarters within their homes for the
women. The household normally consists of a husband and
wife and any unmarried children. There might also be a
newly married son or daughter with their new spouse for a
27
short period of time.
As with any Muslim, the center of religious life is the
mosque. Among the Yakan it is a very simple structure
which does not have a minaret. Instead, a small bamboo
drum is used to call the faithful to prayer. All prayers,
religious activities, and celebrations are officiated by an
Imam.. The Imam prays with an individual who wishes to
address himself to God.
The position of Imam is hereditary by tradition. There
is advanced study necessary so that the Imam may fulfill
his responsibility to be the authority on Islamic law and
custom. As religious leader, the Imam is usually among the
few who actually fast throughout the month of Ramadan and
pray five times per day. The majority limit ritual praying
to Fridays and fast for only a few days during Ramadan.
Very few of the Yakan make the required pilgrimage to
Mecca. Alms are dutifully given at the end of each
U 4- 28harvest.
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To maintain Islamic tradition, Yakan children are
normally taught to recite the Qur'an, but not to read
Arabic script. The group follows the Muslim calendar cele-
brating all of the usual Islamic observances, however some
of them show evidence of pre-Islamic influence. The Yakan
consider themselves to be some of the most pure and orthodox
Islamic believers. Other Muslims do not agree with this
assessment. In recent years Muslim missionaries have
attempted to give them instruction in orthodox Islamic prac-
tices. Little success has been noted. Christian mission-
29
aries have had even less success.
The institution of marriage follows some, but not all,
of the Islamic teachings. The Qur'an allows a man to have
as many as four wives if he can support them. The Yakan
put no limit on the number he may have, but do say that a
man may not marry a second time without the consent of his
first wife, unless he is divorced. It should be noted that
the majority of the men have only one wife and an extremely
small number have more than three. It is the responsibility
of the man to initiate the proposal of marriage. He must
pay a "bride price" plus all expenses incurred, either
directly or indirectly, with the wedding ceremonies. The
wedding consists of two ceremonies; one is a Muslim ritual,
the other is of pre-Islamic origin. Both ceremonies are
conducted by the Imam. The new bride and groom normally
live for a short time with one of their families until they
28
can establish a household of their own. A new home may be
built on the land of either family.
Divorce is fairly common and easily obtained by either
spouse. Upon divorce the land on which the house is built,
as well as the house, must stay within the original family.
They do follow the Muslim law that says that anything the
wife brings into the marriage, as well as that which is
acquired by her during the marriage, is retained by her
after the divorce. The Yakan tradition of inheritance dif-
fers from the Islamic tradition. The Qur'an indicates that
a daughter's inheritance should be one-half that of a son's.
The Yakan treat them equally.
Yakan women have never been segregated, nor do they
wear a veil. Both men and women wear similar clothing,
consisting of tight fitting shirts and pants. They are
commonly seen working side by side, especially in the
fields. Yakan women usually handle the sale of produce in
the market place. Within the last decade the women have
greatly increased their output of woven goods and have
organized to market their goods on a large scale outside of
their community.
The Imam holds the dual responsibility of religious and
secular head of the community. He and the elders usually
sit in judgement of both major and minor crimes. According
to Philippine law, major crimes should be dealt with by
government authorities but this rarely happens.
29
With the influx of western ideas in the Philippines
many new problems have plagued the Yakan. In earlier
times the Yakan were a very private people, who stayed
mostly to themselves in the interior of the island. They
used to trade with the Sama but their contact with Christian
Filipinos and Tausugs was almost non-existant . The
Christian Filipinos have now come to settle on what was
formerly Yakan land. A few of these settlers have acquired
large tracts of land and have turned them into plantations.
The Yakan farmers are now required to have legal title to
their land or they will lose it to Christian Filipinos who
can obtain the necessary documents through "legal" means.
The Muslim rebellion, which is the main element in this
study, affected the Yakan directly since- much of the heavy
fighting was on Basilan. This forced a majority of the
Yakan to leave their homes and land, fearing for their
safety. Although a small number of them joined sides with
the rebels or the Philippine Army, a large number of them
remained neutral, feeling that violence was not the solution
to their problems. Because of their lack of support, the
Yakan will always be a minority among the Moros. They are,




The Tausug are primarily situated within the Sulu chain
of islands with the highest concentration being on Jolo
30
Island, and lesser cells in Zamboanga del Sur and Cotabata
provinces, and Basilan Island.
In Sabah, the Tausug are known as Suluk. Regardless of
name or location, the combined Tausug cultural group of the
33Philippines numbers about 500,000.
A unique feature of the Tausug language, unlike most
others in the Philippines, is that it is relatively free of
variation due to local dialect. Its development seems to
have evolved from the Bisayan languages spoken on Negros,
Cebu, and Leyte. Written communication is primarily
reserved for religious materials among the Tausug and a
Malay-Arabic script is used for this purpose.
The Tausug probably originated in a gradual migration
from northeastern Mindanao brought about by the southward
34
movement of Chinese trade during Mongol times. There is
very little evidence to indicate when Islam was first
introduced into Jolo, but even at the end of the Sung
period Arab trade was very active with South China.
The Sulu Archipelago may have been a way point for this
trade stream. Chinese Muslims moving southwards may also
have been partly responsible for the infusion of Islam into
the Sulu area. Much later in Tausug history, their belief
in Islam was stimulated by Sufi missionaries who came from
Arabia or Iraq via Malaysia and Indonesia.
The historical leadership of the Tausug dates back to
the establishment of the Sulu Sultantate in the mid-fifteenth
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century when most Tausug had converted to Islam. The Sulu
sultanate theoretically unified all of the Sulu Archipelago.
Under this leadership the Tausug traded heavily with China
until the mid-nineteenth century. Many Chinese foods,
weights and measures, and some methods of dress and items of
clothing were adopted by the Tausug during this period.
One of the main goals of the anti-Moro policies of the
Spanish in the sixteenth century was to stop Tausug slaving
and looting raids into the northern islands. The first
large scale conflict between the Tausug and the Spanish
occurred when the Spanish attacked the town of Jolo in
1578. In spite of sporadic raids, the Spanish did not
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establish a permanent garrison in Jolo Town until 1876.
With the American defeat of the Spanish in 18 98, the
Americans met strong resistance from the Tausug. Jolo Town
was occupied in 18 99 but the resistance was so strong that
the Americans did not gain full control of Jolo Island
until 1913.
Under the Pax Americana, all weapons were collected and
slavery was abolished. Under the provisions of the
Carpenter Agreement of 1915, the Sultan of Sulu, Salip
Jamal Ul-Kiram II, in exchange for an annual payment, gave
up his rights to secular control of the Tausug, but retained
religious authority.
As a result of World War II, the Tausug obtained large
quantities of American firearms. To this day the Philippine
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government has never been able to completely control the
island of Jolo. The Tausug have never abandoned traditions
of smuggling, piracy, and raiding, primarily directed to-
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ward the coastal settlements of Mindanao and Basilan.
The purchase of guns and ammunition will usually take
up a major portion of the average Tausug household budget.
For many families it may take up to three years to save
enough money to purchase a firearm. In some areas it is
estimated that 30 to 40 percent of the cash income is
40devoted to the purchase of weapons. The observation was
made in the middle of the nineteenth century that the
Tausug carried their kris (Malay curved sword) much as an
English gentlemen of the Middle Ages carried his sword as a
symbol of his masculinity and power. The symbolism has now
shifted from the kris to the rifle, although it is common
to see both carried. To be properly dressed for a social
affair it is necessary for the Tausug gentleman to carry a
gun. Due to the relative expense of a firearm, not every-
one owns one. Therefore an elaborate and almost ritualized
system of borrowing guns among kinsmen and close friends has
evolved. At any given social event approximately four out
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of every ten guns will have been borrowed.
Many of the most outspoken Muslim students of the
Philippines come from Sulu. The leader of the Moro National
Liberation Front, Nur Misuari, is from Jolo. This has led
to some of the fiercest fighting in the recent past being
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centered in Sulu and especially Jolo. A Battle between
government and Muslim forces in 1974 caused the destruction
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of almost two-thirds of the town of Jolo. A large number
of people fled to Zamboanga and Sabah as a result.
Aside from piracy, raiding and smuggling, the economy of
the Tausug is based in agriculture and fishing. Some food
animals, mostly cattle, chickens, and ducks are also raised.
The primary method of agriculture is to use fields that are
permanently diked and irrigated, however, there are still
a few swidden or slash-and-burn farmers. Most of the
farmers raise crops using a rotation system to allow for
three annual harvests.
The major crops that are raised for profit are copra,
coffee, abaca, and fruit. Copra production was greatly
stimulated after World War II, primarily as a means to gain
capital for the procurement of weapons and ammunition.
Fruit varieties which are sold for profit grow wild in many
of the Tausug areas. The fruit is usually transported to
Mindanao, Cebu, and Negros via motorboat, while the copra
and abaca is usually sold to Chinese middlemen who are on
Jolo Island.
The method of fishing utilized by the Tausug employs
motorized boats in offshore waters. Various equipment is
used including nets, hook and line, and various types of
bamboo traps. There are some fishermen who use illegal
methods including dynamite charges. At night it is common
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to see many lights offshore. These are kerosene lanterns
used to atract fish to the lines.
The typical Tausug community is very dispersed and
loosely knit. With the exception of Jolo Town and the
coastal villages and towns of the fisherman, the Tausug
will normally live close to his fields. The smallest
Tausug grouping is the household or a small cluster of
households containing mostly kinsmen. The next larger
grouping is the lingan or hamlet, this also may include
many close relations. The Kauman or community is the first
grouping which will have a chosen leadership, usually one
man who is known as the headman. The kauman is also the
first level that is identified by a common name. Its
strength and solidarity in relation to other kauman depends
a great deal on the amount of intermarriage within as well
as the effective leadership of the headman. Also important
is the percentage of attendance at a common mosque.
The traditional home and center of the Sulu Sultanate
is Jolo Town. The political presence of the sultan has
drawn many to reside in Jolo Town as well as make it the
political, economic, educational, and transportation center
of Sulu. In 1970, Jolo Town was estimated to have 45,000
43 ...permanent residents. Daily transportation service is
available from Jolo Town by either sea or air. The town is
still in the rebuilding process after the damage that
occurred during the battles between the government and the
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Tausugs in 1974. The town now has several schools, modern
stores, hospitals, movie theaters, and government offices.
The population of Jolo Town, although predominantly Tausug,
is a hodge-podge of Sama , Bodjau, Chinese, and Christian
Filipinos, as well as some Americans and Europeans.
The institution of marriage among the Tausug is one that
has traditionally been by parental arrangement, however,
courtship is becoming increasingly popular among younger
Tausugs. Marriage arrangements between first and second
cousins are common since the parents are kin and this simpli-
fies any problems with inheritance. Negotiations for mar-
riage are many times complex. The groom's family must agree
on a bride's wealth or dowry, which must be delivered in
full before the wedding can take place. The wedding is then
held in the groom's residence with an Imam heading the cere-
mony. The most popular times for weddings are directly
after the Ramadan fast and during Mohammed's birth month.
It is traditional that the newly married couple live for at
least a short time with the wife's family. Later it is
permissable for them to live with the groom's family or to
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establish their own household.
Lately it is becoming more fashionable to elope or ab-
duct one's chosen partner rather than following the tradi-
tional lines. The advantages of this procedure are that it
makes it possible to choose one's mate and that it usually
costs less than more formal arrangements, even though a
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fine must be paid to the headman. If a Tausug male has the
financial ability, it is permissable for him to have
several wives sustained in separate households. Divorce is
permissable as a last resort. It is estimated that less
46than ten percent of Tausug marriages end in divorce.
Childbearing is considered a responsibility of marriage,
if not a requirement. Many peculiar customs are followed
during pregnancy in order to increase the chances of a
successful birth. One very common belief is that one must
abstain from bathing in the sea as it will cause a still
birth. Most births take place either in the woman's resi-
dence or in a hospital in Jolo Town. A new birth in the
community is heralded by the sounding of gongs. An Imam is
summoned to offer prayers for the new arrival, who is then
given either an Arabic or American name. Tausug tradition
teaches that a new child is vulnerable to evil spirits
throughout the first several years of its life. The child
will therefore by given a protective amulet to wear. When
the child is about two years of age a ceremony known as the
paggunting is performed during which a lock of its hair
is cut by an Imam. He then pours perfume over the child's
head and offers prayers.
When the child is five to twelve years old, by tradition
he will begin studying the Qur * an with a religious tutor or
guru. Some time after the completion of this study a public
ceremony is held during which the young Muslims will recite
memorized verses of the Qur 1 an.
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Another important religious ceremony is held when a
young man is circumcised during his early teens. When a
young woman is six or seven she undergoes a comparable cere-
mony. Almost all Tausug children attend some form of ele-
mentary educational institition, but very few ever complete
this education.
The domestic duties of a female Tausug child begin at a
very early age. Early chores may include helping their
mothers cook, working in the vegetable garden, and caring
for any younger children. Young males spend increasing
amounts of time with their fathers in the fields, or fishing.
A rather strictly adhered to custom is a taboo on young men
and women mixing in public. Acquaintances between sexes
are normally made at weddings, funerals, and religious
gatherings. There is some evidence that this taboo is
weakening, especially in the larger towns where foreign
influence is strongest. Unlike many of the Middle Eastern
Islamic countries f Tausug women may participate in commercial
activities and may dress without a veil.
Life after death is a mixture of Islamic beliefs and
local customs. It is the Tausug 's belief that everyone has
four souls and that they depart the body upon death. It is
believed that the body of the dead goes to Hell where the
length of stay is dependent on the amount of misconduct
during life. No matter how bad an individual has been, how-




The Tausug primarily follow the Shafi school of Sunni
Islam. They believe in God and accept the five pillars of
Islam. However, few say the five daily prayers or can
afford a pilgimage to Mecca. The Imam is a central point
in the community. Since very few Tausug know how to read
(including Arabic), one of the Imam's primary duties is to
translate the Qur'an.
There is still a strong belief in environmental spirits.
They are blamed for sickness and thanked for good fortune.
These beliefs and the associated rituals date back to pre-
Islamic times. There are still folk curers, a type of
medicine-men who receive their powers of healing through
dreams and instruction from others like themselves. Herbs
and prayers play an important part in their remedies.
The social system of the Tausug is very complex and
inviolate. Children are taught- to unconditionally respect
and obey their fathers and mothers. Marital relationships
usually endure for a lifetime. Brothers and sisters also
display a high degree of solidarity, especially when
defending a family's honor. This system extends to include
friendships. The ritual friendship is formed when two men
swear on the Qur'an an everlasting friendship in front of
witnesses.
It is believed that the violation of a ritual friend-
ship will cause the offender to become sick and possible
die. Friends are essential in the Tausug system, especially
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when confronted by a feud or dispute.
39
This social system is in many ways dependent on each
individual's position within it. One's social position and
power is determined by such factors as the size of his
personal fortune, the size of his following, titles, personal
courage, and the number of guns owned.
This study is focused on the less than 2,000,000 of the






Their commonalities include religion, way of life, and
an anti-government attitude. Their differences center on
tribal and personal rivalries. They all feel that as a
people they have been left behind by the political parade;
sacrificed to Manila, neglected and abused by Marcos.
They expect a better living; and feel that it is better
to die fighting to get better treatment for their people
than to starve to death or to be abused. As a people the
Moro have existed for over 400 years; most of this time at
war with those that would impose another life style upon
them. This chapter has explained the life styles of the
various Moro groups. We must now study the conflicts which





As Sufism began to take hold in Southeast Asia, rifts
developed between local customs, called adat , and Islam in
which the ulama (the religious learned men and interpreters
of Islam) gradually rose to the status of an elite group.
This group challenged the holders of traditional indigenous
power which lay with the adat. This led to social upheaval
and unrest.
Sufism became the dominant political power in Southeast
Asia toward the end of the fifteenth century, after the fall
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of Madjapahit influence. Adat traditions and power bases
remained a strong influence resisting Islam. Some time in
the eighteenth century in central Java, a new civilization
emerged which blended indigenous customs, Hindu-Buddhism,
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and Sufi mysticism. This Indonesian society was led by an
aristocratic class which was separate from the religious
leadership which had prevailed previously.
Each of the various regional groups of Southeast Asia
accepted or attempted to reject Islam in their own way. The
old ways of the adat tradition with Islam at first super-
imposed, then becoming modified and part of each of the
regional groups, led to the partial absence of cultural and
social unity within Southeast Asia. Another factor which
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was imposed over Islam was the coming of western culture.
The religious aspects of the current Filipino-Muslim con-
flicts in the southern Philippines can be best assessed in
the light of its relationship to the ages-long Islamic
struggle.
B. PHILIPPINE PRE-ISLAMIC PERIOD
The archipelago, now known as the Philippines, was
inhabited by various types of people long before the thir-
teenth century. They spoke many different languages and
dialects, worshiped spirits, and were grouped into a large
variety of regional social structures. Each segment was
essentially independent but when interaction did occur,
frequently so did war. The primary causes of conflict were
the same as those existing today: to grab land, resources,
or anything else of economic value. Furthermore, each in-
group disliked those who did not belong to their class,
group, race, or who did not look or behave like them, or
who did not have beliefs identical to theirs.
Early in the thirteenth century, Islamic growth became
evident in many parts of ancient Malaysia which is now
52Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. In this way
Islam gained recognition in the land of the Tausugs , the
Samals, the Maguindanao, and the Marano.
Gradually the Muslim faith came to dominate the peoples
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of Sulu, Mindanao, Palawan, and in some parts of Luzon.
By the end of the sixteenth century most of the coastal
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villages in the Philippines, if not Islamic themselves,
were victimized by Muslim raids. At the time, corresponding
to the arrival of the Spaniards, the Muslims were focussing
their attention on the spoils of war and slaves. They had
little interest in the territorial expansion of their con-
54trol or the conversion of Filipinos to Islam. There were
vast areas of unpopulated and undeveloped portions of
Mindanao and Sulu. Muslim' raids were not caused by external
threats, territorial expansion, or overpopulation. There
was no cohesive organizational structure developed to bind
Muslim groups together or to Islamize systematically beyond
55the borders of Muslim land.
Due to the already established and predominant adat when
Islam was first introduced, its teachings never fully pene-
trated, the Filipino consciousness. Filipinos lacked the
enthusiasm which was prevalent during the Islamic expansion
in the Middle East.
C. THE SPANISH PERIOD
The pattern of Filipino Muslim conflicts was substan-
tially altered with the arrival of the Spanish who brought
with them an organized religion which was not tolerant of
Islam. The natives of the Philippines became divided into
Indios, who were Christianized, and the Moros, who were
Muslim. The people of the northern and central islands
began to profess Christianity. This was primarily due to
Islam's weakness in this area. The people of the southern
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islands remained loyal to Islam, especially the Tausugs
,
Samals, Maguindanaons , and the Maranaos.
Conflicts between the Spanish and the Moros were inevi-
table. Violence marked the frequent Muslim raids into the
northern areas. In an effort by the Spaniards and Christian
Filipinos to stop the raids, the weaknesses of the never
before challenged Moro forces were highlighted, necessi-
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tating the development of new strategies. As Muslim dis-
unity became apparent, the Spanish became more aggressive
in their quest for gold, spices, and, incidentally,
Christian (Catholic) converts.
The Spanish aim was not only to contain the spread of
Islam, but to conquer it. This conflict in turn precipi-
tated the solidification and strengthening of the Moros,
who fought to retain their homes and country, for the free-
dom to follow the ways of Allah, and to roam and travel
wherever they wished.
An example of the attitudes of the Spanish sent to
Mindanao is evidenced in this message.
... You shall order them not to admit any more preachers
of the doctrine of Mahoma, since it is evil and false,
and that of the Christians alone is good. And because
we have been deceived by the preachers of Barney, and.
the people have become Moros. You shall tell him that
our object is that he be converted to Christianity, and
that he must allow us freely to preach the law of the
Christians, and the natives must be allowed to go hear
the preaching and to be converted, without receiving
any harm from the chiefs.
And you shall try to ascertain who are the
preachers of the sect of Mahoma, and shall seize and
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bring them before me. And you shall burn or destroy
the house where that accursed doctrine has been -
fl
preached, and you shall order that it be not rebuilt.
Of primary importance is the origin of the term "Moro.
"
Since the early history of the Philippine islands, well be-
fore the coming of the Spanish, the people of the southern
Philippines were known by their ethnic groups, namely
Tausug, Samal , Maguindanao, and Maranao. Moro is a Spanish
term for Moor and refers to the Muslim people of mixed Arab
and Berber descent living in northeast Africa , who invaded
and occupied Spain in the eighth century A.D. To the
Spanish, the Moors of Africa and the Moros of the Philippines
were exactly the same enemies.
The hostility that the Spanish felt for the Muslims in
the Philippines was rooted in the long struggle between
Christianity and Islam for control of the Holy Land, and
eventually for the preservation of the Iberian peninsula
59itself. The Spanish had been fighting for seven centuries.
The term "Moro" or "Moor" is derived from the Latin
word "mauri" which was used by the Romans for the inhabi-
tants of the Republic of Mauritania, which covered the
western portion of what is now modern Africa and north-
eastern Morocco. The term has also been linked to the
Spanish word for walls, muros . In the peninsula, the
Spanish used to fear what came over the walls; Muslims.
Thus, the Spanish were predisposed to war with the Filipino
Muslim.
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The entire period of the Spanish in the Philippines was
marked by never-ending wars with the Moros. From the
Muslim's point of view, the wars are regarded as a defensive
jihad reaction to outside aggression against Islamic lands.
The first stage of Moro conflict began with Spain confronting
Brunei for the political interests in the Philippine archi-
6
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pelago. The Spanish were triumphant and gained control of
the Manila Bay area, which had previously been ruled by the
Bornean aristocracy. They effectively eliminated the
Bornean influence on any trade from the Visayas and northern
Mindanao. The Spanish also ventured toward Mindanao in
1571 and destroyed several Muslim fortified outposts there.
The Muslims, at that point, started to realize the potential
of their new enemy, who made use of weapons, technology, and
tactics not seen before. The Sultan of Brunei prepared a
fleet of 200 war vessels armed with 7,000 warriors to retake
Manila, however, the venture never got out of the harbor
because the Spanish attacked Brunei in 1578 and 1581, and
eliminated the power of Borneo over the Philippines.
During the closing years of the sixteenth century the
Spanish attempted to establish colonies on the islands of
Mindanao and Sulu. ' The primary purpose of these actions
was to weaken the Muslim rulers and to remove foreign
teachers of Islam, while attempting to infiltrate Christian
missionaries into the area. The appointed Spanish governor
of Mindanao, Captain Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa was
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dispatched to his God with the help of the Moros of
Maguindanao. Although as a rule the different Muslim
sultanates in the southern Philippines refused to act to-
gether, during this period the Sultan of Ternate and the
Sultan of Mindanao aided each other against their common
Spanish enemy.
As early as the beginning of the seventeenth century,
the Spanish sought to control the Visayas. Prior to the
Spanish arrival the people of the Visayas were the frequent
targets of Muslim raids. They were forced to pay tribute
to the Moros of Maguindanao. The contest was over whether
the Visayas should pay tribute to the Moros or the Spanish.
It was during this period of the Moro Wars that the Muslims
conducted large scale raids against coastal Visayan vil-
lages and abducted large numbers of Visayans as slaves,
some of whom were assigned the task of rowing the large
varaccas (Moro war boats) to help fortify the strength of
the Moro war effort.
The conflict was terminated with a Spanish counter-
offensive that established their power as far as the
Moluccas. The outer limits of the Spanish conquest were
established not by the power of the local Moro sultans but
by the hostility of Spain's rivals from Europe, the
Portuguese and the Dutch.
Spain naturally concentrated its efforts on its con-
trol of Mindanao and Sulu. They fortified Zamboanga in
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1635, and decided it was time to put an end to the coopera-
tion between the Moros and the Dutch. The Spanish sent
expeditions to the south composed mainly of Filipino
Christians. The Spanish found the most effective control
of the Muslims was obtained by devastating their homelands.
The Spanish burned settlements, plantations, orchards, and
fields; killing Moros indiscriminately, and taking large
numbers of Muslims as prisoners for service as galley
slaves. The capital of the Maguindanao sultanate fell to
the Spanish in 1637 and Jolo, another primary Muslim center,
fell in 1638.
When the Moros determined that resistance was futile,
they withdrew into the highlands and interior portions of
the islands and conducted guerilla warfare against the
Spanish. The Moro strategy was relatively effective,
forcing the Spanish into negotiations for peace. Treaties
were signed with Maguindanao in 1645 and with Sulu in 1646.
Although hostilities subsided, insulting and slanderous
remarks by the Spanish continued to be aimed at the sul-
tans, as well as the persistent attempts by missionaries
to convert the "heathens" to Christianity. On their part,
the Moros nursed along their efforts to preserve a jihad
against their Spanish conquerors. A stalemate resulted as
the Spanish were obliged to abandon Zamboanga and concen-
trate their energies on the defense of Manila itself
against the powerful Chinese warlord, Koxinga from Taiwan.
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After the extinction of the Koxinga threat, the Spanish
renewed their attention to Zamboanga. The Spanish dis-
covered that, during their absence from Mindanao, the Moro
sultanates strengthened both their organizational structure
and the Islamic foundations upon which a majority of the
Moros strength relied. This angered the Spanish mission-
aries, especially the Jesuits, whose self-proclaimed goal
was to convert all of the Muslims to Christianity. It was
the Jesuits who campaigned for the Spanish to gain superi-
ority and control over Mindanao. After sporadic fighting,
the Jesuits managed to convince the Sultan of Sulu, Azim-
ud-din I, to allow a Jesuit mission to be set up in Jolo.
That particular sultan was quickly denounced by his
followers and was replaced by his brother. The former
sultan was able to make good an escape to Manila where he
was later baptized as a Christian. This incident did
nothing to stop the killings in the southern Philippines.
Ilanun and Maranao forces continued their attacks against
Christian Filipino settlements in the Visayas. Again the
Spanish had to withdraw their forces to Manila to cope with
a British invasion. Manila fell to the British in 1762 and
was occupied by them for two years. Although Manila was
returned to the Spanish by the peace of Paris, the Spanish
were unable to resume the intensity of their determination
to. conquer the Moros. As the power of Spain declined in
the world, the Spanish were hard pressed to preserve their
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hold on the Philippines. The Moro south was a minor Preb-
le 67lem by comparison.
In 1842 an American naval expedition formalized a trade
and navigation treaty between the United States and Sulu.
The Spanish were in no position to protest this threat to
the Spanish control. In 1843 the French, in connection with
their war against China, sent an expedition to try to estab-
lish a naval base on Basilan Island. Later in the 1840'
s
the British attempted to renew a former trade agreement
with the Sultan of Sulu. As a feeble response, the Spanish
launched;a major offensive ostensibly to curb Suluan piracy.
The first attack was centered on Jolo in 1851 and success-
fully captured the area and advertised to the world that it
claimed Sulu as a protectorate. Spanish steam-powered
gunboats imported to the Philippines in 1848,- continued to
ravage the coastal villages until, in 1860, the Moro resis-
tance had become so weak that the Spanish set up a
"government of Mindanao." This Spanish-inspired government
aided the expansion of the Jesuit missionary cause to
"secure the conversion of the races which have not yet been
subjected." The Sultanate of Sulu agreed to treaties
ft R
acknowledging Spanish sovereignty over his domain.
Because of the advances of other European powers in the
area, the Spanish no longer dreamed of total subjugation of
the Moros. The Spanish only wanted the Moros to accept
Spain as the sovereign power in the Philippines. This
never happened.
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D. THE AMERICAN PERIOD
To the Moros, the most obvious result of the Spanish-
American War of 18 98 was that the Spanish were replaced by
the Americans. Aside from differences in language and
methods of operation, Americans and Spanish seemed to be
the same. Both were Christian, therefore anti-Moro. The
Moros were confused as to how Spain could relinquish
sovereignty to the Americans when they had never had
sovereignty in the Moros' eyes.
When the Americans arrived in Sulu and Mindanao, they
brought with them elemental concepts of "democracy," which
was contrary to the basic traditional beliefs of the sul-
tans,' datus, and other local leaders. American style
democracy professed consent of the governed and respect
for individual rights. The Muslim ruling class believed
that they had almost absolute power over their subjects
and that the lands of the community actually belonged to
its rulers, while their subjects only enjoyed its use at
the leaders' consent. The American forces in the area
forcibly imposed restrictions on certain "barbaric
practices" such as slave trafficking but did so using dis-
70tinctly undemocratic methods.
Other than these restrictions, there was very little
interference with Muslim religious and social practices
until 1902. The Americans were more concerned during this
period with the Philippine Insurrection in the northern
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islands. The additional American forces which became
available at the termination of this conflict allowed a
mass movement of troops toward the south. The Moros became
uneasy because of these large increases in American forces
71in their homelands. Small confrontations rapidly grew
out of control, which, in turn, led to a full-scale
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"pacification" program by the Americans. The Moros were
primarily the losers in the several major battles that were
fought. This was because of their inferior weapons, tech-
nology, and training. The fighting was the most fierce
around Lake Lanao and on the island of Jolo.
The Sulu area of Moroland did not yield any major dis-
turbances during the period in which the U.S. Army was in
control. There was an interesting encounter, however, that
made use of a Muslim weapon which had not yet been encoun-
tered. In 1901, Panglina Hassan and his followers engaged
73American troops near Seit Lake. The primary reason for
the conflict was Hassan's anti-colonial passion. During
this encounter Hassan used sabilallahs , who normally work
alone and had not been used previously as part of the
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overall Moro strategy.
From 1899 to 1913, Moroland was under the direct con-
trol of the United States Army. The last encounter be-
tween the Moros and the American forces was the Battle of
Zud Bagsak in 1913. From 1914 to 1920 Moroland was
governed by an American civilian agency, the Department of
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Mindanao. In August 1916 the Jones Law was signed by
President Woodrow Wilson. The primary effect of this law
was to accelerate the Filipinization of Moroland. The pre-
amble to the act clearly stated that the United States was
determined to relinquish sovereignty over the Philippines
and to recognize their independence as soon as a "stable
government can be established therein." It was also stated
that the Filipinos be given the greatest possible control of
their own domestic affairs within the realm of American
sovereignty so that they may prepare themselves for the
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responsibilities of independence.
E. THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE
In 1920 matters took a downward turn, in Moro's eyes,
when control of Moroland was relinquished to the Filipinos.
The Filipinos were Christians, but also Catholic, and were
regarded as less tolerant than the Protestant Americans.
The organization which gained control of Moroland was known
as the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes in the Philippine
Department of the Interior, which was under the control of
the Philippine Legislature.
Matters grew steadily worse as a Christian led govern-
ment strove to gain footholds in a Muslim land. Throughout
the remainder of the American Period the Moro's leaders
continually petitioned the authorities in both Manila and
Washington to regard them as different and separate people,
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to be considered and dealt with independently from the rest
of the Philippines. They wished to be granted either
independence or to be retained under American rule. They
were fearful of the Christian Filipinos who had fought on
the side of the Spanish against the Moros for so long.
They had come to feel that the Americans had generally good
intentions and could be trusted to carry out their promises.
An example of this uneasiness and distrust of the Christian
Filipinos, as well as their dissatisfaction with the current
government, was evidenced in a petition signed by fifty-
seven prominent leaders in Sulu on June 9, 1921. It
declared that "It is the desire of the people of Sulu that
the Sulu Archipelago be made permanent American territory.
"
It also registers their complaints against the Christian
Filipino government structure that was imposed upon them:
The Philippine Legislature has failed to work for the
benefit of our people. They have failed to recognize
our religion. They have failed to pass any laws
recognizing our marriages, celebrated by our Mohammedan
priests, and according to the present laws in force in
the Philippine Islands, and also the decisions of its
courts, our wives are concubines, and our children
illegitimate. The Philippine government cannot pro-
tect our religious customs, nor our marriages, as they
have no laws to guide them in these questions. 76
In 1924, the Congress of the United States received a
"Declaration of Rights and Purposes" sent to it by a group
of Moro leaders who claimed to represent nearly half-a-
million Mohammedan residents of Mindanao and Sulu. There
did seem to be widespread support of sentiments put forth
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in the declaration and in 1926 the Congress placed it in
the official record. An excerpt of it reads:
In the event that the United States grants indepen-
dence to the Philippine Islands without provision
for our retention under the American flag, it is our
firm intention and resolve to declare ourselves an
independent constitutional sultanate to be known to
the world as the Moro Nation. It is the duty of the
Congress of the United States to make provision at
once -for the security and protection promised to us
when we surrendered our arms to the United States
Army. This promise is just as sacred as any alleged
promises you may have made the Christian Filipinos.
You have left us defenseless, and it is your duty to
protect us or return to us the weapons you took from
us and which we freely gave you, relying on your
promises. 77
President Franklin J}. Roosevelt received a letter which
was a reaction to the formation of the Philippine Common-
wealth and the last steps heading to independence, signed
by one hundred and twenty Lanao datus, which read in part:
Because we have learned that the United States is
going to give the Philippines independence, we want
to tell you that the Philippines is populated by two
different people with different religious practices
and traditions. The Christian Filipinos occupy the
islands of Luzon and the Visayas. The Moros (Muslims)
predominate in the islands of Mindanao and Sulu.
With regard to the forthcoming independence, we fore-
see what condition we and our children who shall come
after us will be in. This condition will be charac-
terized by unrest, suffering, and misery and because
of this we do not desire to be independent. It is by
living under the stars and stripes that those hard-
ships would not bear down against us. The Americans
have ever respected our religion, customs, traditions,
and practices. They have also recognized our rights
to our property. The Americans have directed most
of their efforts for the welfare of our people. 78
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F . SUMMARY
There are several reasons why the Muslims originally
made the American forces the target of violence and mal-
content. The most obvious of these is that the Americans
took the place of the Spanish, who had not exactly won ever-
lasting love from the Moros. Just the fact that they were
there and in the position of an implanted power made them
the subject of attack. The Americans were not yet in the
business of economic exploitation to the degree that the
Spanish had been. Instead, they were trying to enforce the
colonial system. The primary reason for the anti-American
reaction was a fundamental determination to resist an alien
ruler. It was the product of Muslim ethnic pride and an
intense sense of freedom.
Militarily, the American presence was a new kind of
challenge to the Muslim warriors' code of honor and tradi-
tional qualities of individualism and personal courage, as
well as skill in the use of traditional weapons. The
American military stressed group and team concepts as well
as the use of technologically superior instruments of war.
Thus, there was a severe contrast in the image of military
forces who were put into an adversary situation so abruptly.
The Americans saw the Moro warrior as one of exceptionally
fine warrior qualities, but with extremely ineffective
military hardware. The Muslim image of the American mili-
tary was one of an effective fighting force whose superi-
8
ority was found in technology.
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In fact, the American military specifically developed
the Colt 4 5 semi-automatic handgun to more effectively stop
Moro warriors. So great was their courage and religious
zeal that smaller caliber weapons proved ineffective unless
they were aimed very accurately.
The Moros easily recognized the usefulness of quality
weapons. The end of their military dominance in Sulu and
Mindanao in 1913 signaled the surrender of an inferior
fighting system to a more efficient one. Many of the con-
flicts between Moro and American forces may have been
centered on the possible capture of American weapons. The




The Muslims never accepted that they had been defeated
by superior warriors, only by superior weapons. Had the
Moros possessed weapons approximating those of the American
forces, the Americans too would have been forced out of
Moroland.
Thus it is easy to see how, on gaining independence,
the Filipinos inherited not a peaceful area, but an area
that had known civil strife and resistance to the governing
power throughout its centuries of existence. Religious
differences lay at the heart of the Moro conflict.
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III. THE ROOTS OF THE CURRENT PROBLEM
A. MIGRATION
The American period in the Philippines came to a close
at the termination of World War II , when sovereignty was
receded in 1946. This period in Philippine history was
occupied with recouping war losses and the establishment of
the framework and stability necessary for any new nation's
survival.
The new government regarded the southern portions of
the nation as a resource-rich frontier albeit rough and
inhospitable. Officially sponsored colonization of these
areas had begun in 1912. This was now seen as a national
solution to agrarian discontent which was threatening
government solidarity due to increasing population pressure.
Every settler was supplied with an official title deed.
Most Muslims felt themselves bound only by customary laws
and refused to obtain "official" titles to their ancestral
lands. Some of the more shrewd datus understood the impli-
cations of these changes and obtained titles to their own
82lands and, in many cases, to the lands of their clansmen.
This, in turn, has led to today's disenchantement with some
of the traditional Muslim leadership. Some of the leader-
ship has legal basis for large-scale landlordism while
others sold out making themselves rich and their clansmen
i ^i 8 3landless.
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The government further antagonized the Moros by using
their homeland as a place of exile for former members of
the communist Hukbalahap movement (Huks) and their
*.v 84sympathizers.
Land disputes rapidly became the focus of concern in
Moroland. Due to the imposition of government rule from the
north, Christians usually controlled the agencies which made
8 5
and enforced land decisions. As Christian settlers
increased in numbers, they began to dominate schools, court
systems, the military, professions, heavy enterprise, and
small scale farming.
By 1950, some 8,300 families had been moved to govern-
ment settlements in the south. Between 1950 and 1954
another 1,500 families arrived. By 1963 the National
Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) was
controlling settlements which included over 25,000 families
and 695,000 hectares of land. This migration pattern was
drastically increased during the Marcos regime. Over three
million Christians settled in Mindanao between 1966 and
1976. 87
The Christian migration to the south coincided with a
period of increasing Christian presence as well as an in-
flux of Islamic missionaries from Indonesia, Egypt, and
other Islamic countries. Small Islamic organizations
sprang into existence all over Moroland. There was also a
large increase in chartered pilgrimage ships to Mecca, young
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people attending Islamic universities overseas, and the
building of mosques.
B. CORREGIDOR
The present Muslim unrest had its start in 1966 as
President Marcos was beginning his first term in
Malacanag Palace. His pre-occupation with foreign affairs
and the Philippines claim to Sabah allowed problems in the
south to become much worse and subsequently, out of control.
The current Muslim uprising traces its origin to the
Jabidah episode, otherwise known as the CorregidOr
Incident.
The Corregidor Incident started with a top-secret
project code-named Operation Merdeka. It involved the re-
cruitment primarily of Tausugs in Sulu for what they thought
was a private army, something not uncommon even today. In
December, 1967, Operation Merdeka and its 18 Muslim re-
cruits were transferred to the isolated island of Corregidor
8 8in Manila Bay. At this point the code name was changed
to Jabidah and the recruits began intense training in the
techniques of infiltration, sabotage, and assassination, as
well as jungle survival. The training was administered by
what was called the Civil Affairs Office and was kept so
secret that most of the high ranking officers of the Armed
8 9Forces were completely unaware of its existence.
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In March, 1968, news agencies reported a mutiny on
Corregidor in which 14 Muslims had been killed and 17 were
90
missing. This was verified by a Muslim trainee after he
was rescued in Manila Bay where he had been floating,
clinging to a log, seriously wounded. This man claimed
that he and his fellow trainees had complained of not being
paid and wished to resign. He said that they were then
escorted to the airfield on Corregidor and shot. He had
managed to roll behind a bush hidden by darkness then made
91his way into the water.
There are two opposing views of this incident which
surfaced upon investigation. The one which was favored by
government officials was that this force was formed to
divert personnel that might have otherwise joined a clan-
destine guerrilla force led by Sulu Muslims whose purpose
was to invade and seize Sabah which had once been part of
the Sulu Sultanate. In theory this was intended to prevent
92
war and the needless loss of life.
The explanation favored by the Muslims was that the
secret force was formed to invade and seize Sabah for the
Philippine government. Tausugs were chosen because they
were Muslims (as is the population of Sabah) and they speak
a language which is mutually understandable. They were
also civilians which afforded the government deniability.
The Muslim trainees rebelled when they discovered that
their training would lead them into conflict with fellow
93Muslims.
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C. THE MUSLIM INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT
The climax of the Corregidor Incident was the military
court martial of the accused officers and men. The acquit-
tal of all involved sparked widespread outrage among the
Muslims. There were demonstrations all over Manila and the
more militant Muslims started organizing an anti-government
political movement that had decidedly revolutionary under-
tones. Support for these activities came from many Muslims
Some were disgruntled due to a perceived lack of
government support to help them out of an economically
depressed condition. Others were angry that the government
94had not pursued the Sabah claim as a Muslim issue. Still
others felt that the Corregidor Incident was proof of the
low regard for Filipino Muslim lives on the part of the
government.
On May 1, 1968, Datu Udtog Matalam declared the forma-
tion of the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM) . This
organization called for the creation of an independent
state (Minsupala) to include most of Mindanao, Sulu, and
95Palawan. The motives given for the formation of the MIM
were objections to Sabah being claimed by Filipino
Christians, indignation over the Corregidor massacre, and
9 6
the deplorable economic conditions in the Muslim areas.
The reasons for the MIM's creation proved not to be as
important as the threatened feeling it evoked among the
Christians. Soon, every instance of Muslim violence was in
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some way tied to MIM. There were press reports of
Christians fleeing Muslim areas. If this was not actually
the case when it was reported, it soon became a self-
fulfilling prophecy. Rumors were widespread that Datu
Matalam would soon declare the independence of Mindanao
97from the Philippines and form the Bangsa Moro Nation.
Reports followed of travellers being attacked, roving bands
of armed Muslims, homesteads being raided, and government
officials being singled out and attacked.
Many Christians, especially those that stood to lose
the most, chose to stand fast and arm themselves. This led
to sporadic encounters between the various groups. Although
there was occasional bloodshed, the reports in Manila
greatly exaggerated the facts. An ambush in the town of
Magpet reportedly killed twenty-six Muslims, but when
government officials arrived to investigate, they found
that an over-zealous Christian mayor had exaggerated the
body count. The actual death count was sixteen--not
Muslims—but gamecocks killed in games the previous
98Sunday. Rumors became so desperate and widespread that
many in Manila expected a declaration of independence and
open warfare at any time. To counter any such Muslim
movement, combat-ready troops were airlifted to Cotabato.
As the armed presence increased, so did the numbers of
kidnappings, ambushes, and killings.
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D. PRE-MNLF VIOLENCE
From mid-1970 into 1971 violence centered in two
provinces where migration had caused the greatest shifts
in population and electoral percentages, Lanao del Norte
and Cotabato del Norte. Bands of Christian vigilantes were
in frequent collusion with Philippine constabulary units in
their areas. These alliances were probably precipitated by
the fact that the vigilante groups were primarily Ilongo
and the constabulary was primarily Christian and led by an
99
Ilongo. In response to the Christian groups, which be-
came known as Ilagas or "rats," the Muslims formed their
own groups which became known as "blackshirts" in Cotabato
and "barracudas" in Lanao.
By the end of 197 0, the fighting between the Ilagas
and the blackshirts in Cotabato had caused the closing of
most schools, a nearly complete disruption of the local
economy, and the mass evacuation of thousands of innocent
victims. As a result of these clashes, the casualty and
refugee statistics soared on both sides of the conflict.
The Social Welfare Administration estimated that 30,000
Muslims and Christians had been forced to vacate their
homes and farms in Cotabato alone.
In town after town, Christians pleaded for government
protection. Correspondingly, town after town came under
Constabulary control. On June 19, 1971, seventy Moro men,
women, and children were executed after being herded into
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a mosque in Barrio Manili, Carmen, North Cotabato.102 On
July 4, 1971,. in the town of Wao, in Banao del Sur province,
a grenade exploded in a mosque and over sixty Muslim homes
were burned by Ilagas. In Lanao del Norte the situation
was even worse. By September of 1971 over 50,000 people
had been evacuated. In October, 17 soldiers in a 22 man
constabulary patrol were killed by barracudas in the town
of Magsaysay. This led to 66 Muslims being killed the next
103day in the same town. In November in Barrio Tacub in
the municipality of Kauswagan, approximately 2 00 Moros, who
had been issued safe conduct passes to return to their
homes to vote, were fired upon by government troops. At
least 40 were killed with no casualties on the government
side. An investigation by the National Bureau of
Investigation resulted in charges of multiple homicide
being brought against 21 army men including thtee officers
and three civilians, one of whom was a Christian mayor.
Muslim leaders wishing to curb the violence had instructed
their followers to allow Philippine law to take recourse
against the offenders of justice. In March of 1972 the
charges against the three civilians and five of the soldiers
were dropped. The remaining 16 soldiers never had judicial
action reported against them so it is presumed that the case
• 4.1 A A 1Q 4was quietly dropped.
By the end of 1971, the war in Mindanao had taken 8 00
lives by official estimates and there were 100,000
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refugees. In 1972 the conflict had spread to Zamboanga
del Sur and Lanao del Sur. There were strong rumors of an
attack on Sulu which spurred the Tausugs to prepare to
defend themselves against any possible encounter.
An important result of these atrocities and conflicts
was the public statement by Moammar Kadaffi of Libya
charging the Philippine government with genocide and
threatening aid to the Moros. Although this was the first
overt statement of its kind by a foreign Muslim leader,
there is evidence that Kadaffi was already supplying aid to
the "opposition" in the Philippines.
E. MARTIAL LAW
On September 21, 1972, President Ferdinand Marcos
declared martial law. One of the stated reasons was the
existence of conflict between Muslims and Christians in
Mindanao and Sulu. He was quoted as stating that the vio-
lent disorder in that region had resulted "...in the killing
of over 100 civilians and about 2000 armed Muslims and
Christians, not to mention the more than five hundred
thousand of injured, displaced, and homeless persons as
well as the great number of casualties among our government
troops and the paralyzation of the economy of Mindanao and
Sulu." 107
The declaration of martial law served only to strengthen
the Muslim struggle for independence. Martial law gave
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exclusive power to Filipino Christians (Marcos, his
family and associates, "technocrats" in Manila, and the
military) . It left no room for anti-government political
activity, forcing total acceptance of the regime or revolu-
tionary activities, with no median available. The imposi-
tion of martial law required immediate collection of guns
from civilians. Not only would this have removed an
important status symbol from the Moros, but it would have
prevented the future use of force if all else failed.
Armed defiance of martial law first occurred in Lanao
108del Sur on October 21, 1972. An armed force of several
hundred Moros laid seige to the Philippine Constabulary
Headquarters in Marawi City and took control of the
Mindanao State University campus. The radio station on
campus was used to plead for support from fellow Muslims.
This message stated that since Spanish times the government
of the Philippines had been against the Muslims and that it
was necessary to overthrow the government for the cause of
Islam. Government troops arrived that same evening and
109
regained control after a 24 hour battle. Additional
fighting spread quickly to Lanao, Cotabato, Zamboanga, and
the Sulu provinces.
F. GROUPS AND LEADERS
1. The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)
Many small Muslim liberation organizations came into
existence after the Corregidor massacre in addition to the
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Muslim Independence Movement. One such organization, which
began as an underground movement in the youth section of
the MIM and continued after the government forced MIM to
disband in 1970, was the MNLF which surfaced with the
declaration of martial law and gained strength rapidly. It
became the strongest, best disciplined and coordinated of
the dissident Moro groups.
The MNLF is a loosely knit organization. Organiza-
tionally, the MNLF has parallel political and military
structures. A central committee of around twenty indivi-
duals heads the political structure, which also includes a
political bureau, a propaganda and intelligence bureau, and
provincial and barrio committees. The Bangsa Moro Army
(BMA) is the military portion of the MNLF. It is headed by
a field marshall who reports to, but is not directly super-
vised by, the central committee. There are also field
marshalls at the provincial level and zone commanders at the
city and town level. Regular BMA units are augmented by
"home defense units" which are comprised of Muslims who have
been trained but maintain their civilian status unless
called upon to defend their local area. Although rarely
accomplished, ideally new recruits are first screened for
suitability and then given six months of training and poli-
4.- 1 A 4-' 112tical education.
The MNLF has enjoyed several advantages which have
grown from superior knowledge of the territory in which
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they operate and ties with the overall Islamic world.
Primary among these has been their control of critical
resources, especially the supply of weapons. Until the
last half of 1975, when Tun Mustapha was removed from power,
their primary supply of weapons and ammunition was by small
fast boats from Sabah. Weapons ranged from automatic rifles
to anti-tank rocket launchers. Their primary supplier now
has become the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) . The
troops of the AFP are chronically disillusioned and suffer-
ing from low morale. This may be attributed to being in a
remote hostile area where their adversaries have the advan-
tage of familiarity. The government's inability to ade-
quately support its troops in the southern region
logistically , to include being delinquent with pay, leads
some AFP personnel to sell their weapons to the Muslims out
113
of a sense of futility or fiscal necessity. There are
reports that some MNLF units have formalized territorial and
supply arrangements with AFP units operating in their
114
areas.
The primary leadership for the MNLF since its incep-
tion in 1967 has been Nur Misuari , a former political science
instructor. Misuari comes from an extremely poor Samal-
Tausug family. His father was never able to provide for the
family due to poor health. Misuari was able to attend the
University of the Philippines (UP) only because of a
scholarship (which was barely adequate) . There were times
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at the university that he was forced to skip meals. He
gained prominence through his enthusiastic participation in
campus activities. His favorite indulgences were the music
116
of Nat King Cole, poker, reading, or long walks.
Misuari's ideological foundation was largely laid
during his time at the University of the Philippines. He
was associated with the formation of the Bagong Asya (New
Asia) in 1964; a group which first attempted to inject ideo-
logical undertones into the campus election process. Later
he became one of the founders of a student organization
known as the Kabataang Makabyong (KM) or Patriotic Youth and
for a while he was the chairman of the Western Mindanao
sector of the KM which became widely known as a Marxist
117front organization. The KM was the first opposition
group to be outlawed by the government at the outset of
martial law.
Misuari intensively studied the teachings of Marx
and other economists, but maintained his devotion to Islam.
He became a staunch anti-capitalist with a deep sense of
socialist mission. To rationalize the differences between
Islam and communism, it was argued by the Misuari group
that everything Mao Tse-tung had proposed had been previous-
ly proposed by the Prophet. Misuari and his followers
chose to preach their beliefs in the name of Islam because
many of the Moros were too strongly rooted in Islamic
fundamentals to fully accept Marxism's call for the
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abandonment of God.. They did choose, however, to study and
use Maoist tactics.
Upon obtaining a degree, Misuari joined the
University of the Philippines political science department
and continued his involvement in Philippine Islamic poli-
tics and debates. In 1967 he became the primary individual
responsible for the formation of the Philippine Muslim
Nationalist League and the editor of its official newspaper,
the Philippine Muslim News . It was at this point that
Misuari had to come to grips with two basic problems in-
volved in forming a national organization; the need for
capital and political support. This would have to involve
evoking support from non-government sources and traditional
Muslim groups. The problem was that his idea of justice
for Filipino Muslims involved the Marxist principles of
egalitarianism, a total restructuring of power within the
Muslim community, and the liquidation of the privileged
class. This translated into a major obstacle between him
and his necessary support. With the formation of the
Muslim Independence Movement, Misuari found the support he
needed. He took part in a guerrilla training program out-
side of the Philippines. While abroad he developed the
necessary contacts and the independence required to form the
MNLF as an underground organization in 1972. From this
point on he slowly disassociated himself and his organ!za-
119
tion from the traditional leadership of the Moros.
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He is married to the niece of the wife of Salih
12Utulalum, a long time political leader in Sulu.
Other leaders challenged Nur Misuari, chief among
whom was Hashim Salamat. Shortly after the breakdown of the
Tripoli Agreement, several rather drastic splits occurred
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within the MNLF. Salamat, a Maguindanao and member of
the MNLF central committee , broke away from the main
organization favoring autonomy over independence.
Salamat is said to have been a "well bred" young
man, given to solitude and introspection. Corruption among
traditional politicians in Cotabato (his native area)
caused him to develop a strong dislike for them. Unfortu-
nately this also meant a dislike for his relatives since
they were heavily involved in politics. In protest, he
122
changed his name from Abdul Salam Hashim.
Salamat' s religious training was the foundation for
his declaration that Islam was the central point on which
the MNLF's ideology was based. Although this had not been
publicly declared with Misuari's MNLF, no Moro group had
ever disagreed with this concept. Salamat' s group quickly
elected him chairman of the "real" MNLF. Although con-
fusing, this did not seem to disrupt the original MNLF's
activities. In fact, there was a high level of cooperation
123between their combat units in the field. Salamat leads
his faction from outside the Philippines, splitting his
time between Cairo, Egypt and Pakistan.
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Shortly after the MNLF split, another group, which
was predominantly Maranao, surfaced calling itself the
Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization (BMLO) with headquarters
in Jidda, Saudi Arabia. The BMLO was headed by an old name
in Moro politics, Rashid Lucman.
Lucman, a Mindanao sultan, was the linking factor
between Moro liberation leadership and outside supporters
124
such as Tun Mustapha of Sabah and Kadaffi of Libya.
Although Lucman ' s political base was in Lanao del Sur, he
commonly projected his influence far beyond these boundaries.
He was listed by the Philippine Commission on elections as
having a private army. He was frequently mentioned in
rumors of violence and large profits connected with timber
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concessions awarded by the government. Lucman ' s reputa-
tion with the government was established early in the Moro
uprising when he chartered a Saudi Arabian ship to trans-
port Muslims on a pilgrimage to Mecca, but failed to pay
the bill. As a result the Saudi government seized a
Philippine ship and crew in 1969 which happened to dock at
1 2 fi
a Saudi port. The Philippine government was forced to
pay the debt to obtain their release.
Lucman was the patron of several young Muslims
whose names later became connected with the Moro liberation
127
movements, the most notable of which was Nur Misuari.
Much of the current style of radical leadership among the
Moro liberation movements can be traced back to Lucman.
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It has been said that Lucman, a former congressman
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and leader of Lanao province, is related to Tun
129Mustapha. Regardless of his official connections and
possible transgressions Rashid Lucman has high credibility
among Moros because of his frequent travels to Muslim
countries.
Prior to the formation of the BMLO, Lucman was pro-
claimed "Paramount Sultan of the Royal House of Sulu" by
direction of the Marcos government. This title, as well as
the BMLO's relatively moderate position, led many to believe
that the BMLO was more a brainchild of Manila than Mindanao.
He died in 1984.
A fourth group has recently become known, whose aim
is to shore up the factionalism within the Moro camp. It
has identified itself as the MNLF-Reformist Group, calling
for autonomy as its realistic goal and rejecting the inde-
pendence and succession goal of the Misuari organization.
The MNLF-Reformist Group is headed by a Maranao, Dimasankay
Pundato. He is a former member of Misuari's MNLF who
resigned in 1982. Pundato 1 s group, as well as the BMLO, has
been attempting to convince the Islamic Conference and the
separate Islamic governments to retract recognition of
Misuari's MNLF because they believe that independence is an
unreachable goal and that pursuing it would only make
matters worse for the Moros. Pundato leads his organization
from Sabah where he enjoys the advantage of being close to
those he leads.
74
G. ETHNIC SPLITS IN THE DISSIDENT GROUPS
Among the four primary organizations and leaders, Nur
Misuari enjoys the greatest popularity among the Moro
leaders within the Philippines and is followed by the
largest portion of the Moro population supporting armed
132
struggle. Because Misuari is a Tausug, his MNLF is more
highly supported by the Tausug community than by the other
ethnic groups.
The Pundato-Salamat-Lucman groups are primarily composed
of Maguindanao or Maranao peoples and the leaders have been
from traditional Moro nobility and bloodlines. Their
primary external support has been from the traditional
Islamic nations, i.e. Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia
has actively participated in persuading the Philippine
government to make decisions more favorable to the Moros on
behalf of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. The
availability and price of oil have been used as enticements
133
when dealing with these issues.
Misuari's MNLF, with its commitment to Islamic national-
ist ideology and revolutionary struggle, has formed its
primary ties with Islamic countries pursuing similar goals.
Misuari had maintained his residence and headquarters in
Tripoli, Libya but has recently moved and is believed to
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shuttle between Syria and Iran.
In June of 197 9 an MNLF delegation led by Misuari was in
Tehran to attend a conference of the "enemies of American
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Imperialism in Iran. " During this visit the MNLF delegation
asked Iran's support for the Bangsa Moro Revolution. Help
was granted by the Ayatollah Khomeini who said "the victory
of the Islamic revolution of Iran would not be complete
until the oppressed Bangsa Moro Muslims in the southern
Philippines won their victory. An official MNLF office
was opened in Tehran soon after their meeting and in
November 1980 this office was granted embassy status and the
corresponding official recognition by Iran's Islamic govern-
ing
ment. To further its support of the MNLF, Iran cut off
its oil supply to the Philippines in addition to the United
137States, South Africa, and Israel.
H. EFFORTS AT PEACE
1. Kuala Lumpur Conference
The first diplomatic openings between the government
and the Moros took place at the Kuala Lumpur summit meeting
of the Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers in June 1974.
The MNLF sent a delegation entrusted with the delivery of
two documents. One was a description of the "rise and fall
of Moro statehood" to gain attention to the plight of the
Filipino Muslims. The second was an "appeal letter" re-
questing assistance in the Moro struggle for succession.
The foreign ministers response was less than the Moros had
wished for. It called for "a political and peaceful solu-
tion. . .within the framework of the national sovereignty and
139territorial integrity of the Philippines." As a result
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of this conference, the Foreign Ministers denounced the
socioeconomic measures proposed by the Philippine govern-
ment to improve Muslim areas as being inadequate. They
also recognized the MNLF as the representative of Philippine
M 1 • 140Muslims.
With the high cost of military encounters in the
south and the threat of oil sanctions, the government was
compelled to make new overtures in an attempt to remedy the
141Moro problem. To that end Muslims were abruptly ap-
pointed to government positions, "rebel leaders" were brought
together for peace talks, and new offices and agencies were
quickly assembled. Additional improvement programs and
appropriations were announced and rumors were spread about
factionalism, corruption, and foreign influence within the
MNLF leadership. Just prior to the 1975 meeting of the
Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference in Jidda, Saudi Arabia,
President Marcos proposed the restructuring of the southern
142Philippines into areas that would have "virtual autonomy."
Although the government's efforts at reducing the
effectiveness of the MNLF leadership were successful in the
short term, the long term effects are yet to be seen. With-
out a unified front the MNLF and its various factions have
been unable to maintain sufficient control of their elements
to enable them to effectively negotiate for a cease-fire or
end to the hostilities.
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2 . Tripoli Agreement
After arduous diplomatic effort, a meeting was
arranged between the members of the Islamic Conference of
Foreign Ministers and Imelda Marcos (as the representative
of the Philippine government) in November and December of
1976. The negotiations which followed, which included MNLF
officials, finally led to a cease-fire and the initial con-
ditions for a peace settlement.
The cease-fire was to be coordinated and observed
by a committee composed of representatives of the Philippine
government, the MNLF, and the Islamic Conference. Tentative
conditions for a peace settlement within the agreement in-
cluded autonomy for the Muslims in thirteen provinces.
This would include Islamic courts, a legislative assembly
and executive council, and administrative system, and repre-
sentation in the central government. Additionally, Muslim
regional security forces would maintain law and order while
the central government would maintain the responsibility for
foreign policy and national defense. Control over education,
finance, and the economic system was to be in Muslim hands.
Also the right to a "reasonable percentage" of the resources
derived from mining within the autonomous areas was agreed
143
on.
The methodology for the change to autonomy was
agreed on between Kaddafi and Mrs. Marcos on March 19, 1977.
Mrs. Marcos agreed to declare the thirteen provinces to be
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autonomous and to appoint a provisional government which
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would then hold a referendum on "administrative details."
On March 26, in keeping with this accord, Nur Misuari was
appointed to head the provisional government composed of
fifteen MNLF members, thirteen provincial governors, and a
regional commissioner.
Misuari and the other appointed members of the MNLF
did not surface to claim their positions within the pro-
visional government, leaving the remaining appointed offi-
cials to compose the questions for the proposed referendum.
Rather than addressing the "administrative details" of the
issue, they dealt with the question of autonomy itself. In
areas where there were large numbers of Christians, they
were given the option of withdrawing from any association
with the "autonomous Muslim government." The MNLF, Kaddafi,
and the Islamic Conference complained that the agreement
had been for a referendum to formulate "...the administra-
tive agreements within the areas of autonomy. .. and this
means that the people be asked how to organize themselves
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administratively within the areas of autonomy." They
argued that autonomy was not open to question.
The referendum was held on April 17, 1977, with an
overwhelming majority voting against the merger of the
thirteen provinces into a single autonomous region. This
resounding defeat for theMNLF was undoubtedly due to the
Christians, who dominated the region numerically,
79
economically, and politically. It is understandable that
they would be against any shift of power to the Muslims,
especially to the MNLF.
Unfortunately, the Tripoli accords ended in a
stalemate amid mutual recriminations. Although the nego-
tiations had completely broken down, the cease-fire
remained in effect until October 1977 when the AFP resumed
full-scale operations.
In March 1980 the Philippine government released a
"primer" in which the Tripoli Agreement was described as
having "lapsed or expired" because of the "intransigence
of the MNLF. " Within this document was also a denial of the
MNLF as the legitimate representative of the Muslims of the
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southern Philippines. Misuari's response was that the
MNLF would no longer strive for autonomy but would revert
148
to its original goal of succession and independence.
3. Karachi Summit
The most recent attempt at reconciliation took
place in Karachi, Pakistan in January 1983 during the
World Muslim Conference. During this -conference the Moros
made an unsuccessful attempt at reunifying their various
groups. The conference was dominated by Muslims residing
in the Philippines with strong government connections.
Rashid Lucman attended, but there was a noticeable void
left by Misuari, Salamat, and Pundato. The primary accom-
plishment of the conference was a document entitled "The
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Karachi Declaration for Peace and Unity." The signatories
proclaimed their interest and support for the resumption of
negotiations with the Filipino government on behalf of the
149Moros.
The Karachi Conference also produced a reaffirma-
tion of official support by the Islamic Foreign Ministers
for Misuari and the MNLF. They restated their desire for
direct negotiations with the Philippine government to gain
full implementation of the Tripoli Agreements. The Foreign
Ministers coninued to refuse support for Misuari's succes-
sionist stance and seem unlikely to impose any direct sanc-




V. HEADS OR TAILS
Within the context of the Moro Problem there emerge cer-
tain factors, some of which favor violence, others peace.
In either case the United States and U.S. citizens within
the Philippines are deeply concerned.
A. FACTORS FAVORING VIOLENCE
The results of the Christian migration from the north
have undoubtedly caused the most profound problems for the
Moros. There is a feeling among many Filipinos that the
Muslims have been diluted and are therefore less of a
threat.
On the other hand the Muslims insist that the figures
only prove how their plight has been intensified. According
to official government statistics there were 2.5 million
people in the southern Philippines in 1948. In 1976 this
151figure had risen to 9.7 million. Government estimates
indicated that Muslims comprised 98 percent of the popula-
tion in the south in 1913, but only 21 percent in 1976.
Although the Muslims have decreased as a percentage of the
population they have not decreased in actual numbers. When
taking into account the number of Muslims who have fled over
the border to Sabah as well as natural population growth,
they have maintained a sizeable presence in these regions.
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There are presently 2.5 million Muslims in the south.
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In a recent interview with the author, the previously-
quoted Dr. Samuel K. Tan stated that "the Moros are as
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strong now as ever. " The strength of this statement
will be tested by future events. It is clear, however,
that any move by the government predicated on the further
dilution of the Muslim population would lead only to in-
creased tension and bloodshed.
With even a casual study of history one would be able
to surmise that introducing Christians into a predominantly
Muslim area will be hazardous at best. When these same
Christians (or non-Muslims) settle on the ancestral home-
lands of Muslims the problem is compounded, as we see in
Israel. In the Philippines, the migration program pursued
by the government has done irreparable damage to the soli-
darity of the Moro homeland. Any move by the government to
continue with further southward Christian migration will
only aggravate an already tense situation. Agrarian dis-
content and overpopulation, especially in the central and
northern islands, has made it impossible for the government
to reverse the damage already done. The proximity factor
is therefore one which can not be alleviated.
There is a strong perception among the Moros that the
government is predisposed to favor Christians. This per-
ception stems from the fact that the majority of the
Philippines, 90 percent, is Christian with the government
having similar representation. The government-sponsored
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program of southward migration has only strengthened this
idea. It must be conceded that there is a moral obligation
for the government to protect the people that it urged to
resettle in Mindanao. This impression of favoritism has
evolved for some into the feeling that anything Christian
is bad and vice versa. Any major decisions by the govern-
ment directly affecting the Muslim areas that can even
remotely be construed as favoring Christians will likely be
met with violent opposition.
In an attempt to protect the Christian settlers in the
south, as well as maintain the general peace, the government
has stationed heavily armed troops within the Muslim areas.
It has been suggested, however, that the level of violence
in the Muslim areas is directly proportional to the number
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of troops in the area. The AFP is comprised of primarily
Christian Filipinos from the northern islands. A tour of
duty in the south is not one of the more preferred assign-
ments. Living conditions for the common soldier are miser-
able and difficulties with supply channels only make
matters worse. Accenting the distance from home is the fact
that the languages of the islands are spoken regionally so
a soldier from Baguio is not likely to understand the citi-
zens of Jolotown which only serves to make him feel more
lonely and isolated.
All of these factors lead to an undisciplined and un-
happy military. Interservice rivalry between Army and
84
Constabulary units coupled with poor morale has led to
periodic open warfare between opposing soldiers of the
AFP.
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These factors have also led to atrocities among the
civilian populace, particularly by police and civilian home
defense forces. Looting, rape, and murder have been docu-
mented all too often in these areas. It has been common
for commanders to overlook such activities by their men.
This has only served to further antagonize the Muslim popu-
lation. Any move by the government to increase the military
presence will only increase the likelihood of bloodshed.
Any atrocity by troops not dealt with by the military will
be dealt with by the Moros.
The Moro requirement for personal firearms as a male
status symbol has also proven to be a major factor against
the peaceful resolution of Islamic disputes within the
Philippines. A major cause of violence at the onset of
martial law was the government's attempts to disarm the Moro
civilian populace. Any such move now would surely be met
with the same reaction.
Additionally, the Moro inclination for frontier style
justice leads to blood feuds involving firearms. On occa-
sion, the police or military have become involved in these
feuds because of a lack of understanding of the situation.
This has further complicated issues and increased the
bloodshed. Regardless of the reasons for these encounters,
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the presence of so many potential adversaries within so
close a proximity must lead to occasional strife with the
possibility of all-out warfare.
Land disputes are still common in the formerly all
Muslim areas. Today the Muslims own less than 17 percent
of the land on Mindanao which was previously totally under
their control. Most of the land still owned by Muslims is
in remote non-arable mountainous regions far from markets
and infrastructure. Over 8 percent of the Muslims have
159become landless tenants.
It has become all too easy for those involved in land
disputes to label them as religious conflicts. Usually
these disputes are between Muslims and Christians, the
former claiming ancestral rights with the latter claiming
legal rights. Although a larger number of Muslims have
been appointed to the agencies who are intended to settle
land disputes, they are still dominated by Christians dis-
placed from the northern islands. Any change of policy by
the government that could favor Christian settlers will
cause a disproportionate negative response by native
Muslims who feel they have been wronged over the past 4 00
years and are due compensation for their losses.
Within the Philippines there is a duality of economic
development that has become especially acute over the past
fifty years. This is manifested primarily in a mini-North-
South debate. Development has always been centered first
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in Manila and then has reached out from there. Typically,
the further from Manila a problem is, the less emphasis is
accorded it. With this more mature infrastructure, it is
not difficult to understand why most new development and
investment is within the northern areas. What small amount
of improvement might have been afforded the south has now
been sharply decreased with the severe economic crisis
being faced by the Philippines.
No growth is expected in the gross national product for
1984 and inflation will probably top twenty percent. The
real wages and general standard of living for most
Filipinos, including the Moros , will fall significantly due
1 c o
to this economic crisis. It follows that government
promises of large scale infrastructure improvements will
not likely be realized in the foreseeable future. This can
only increase the frustration of the Moro people and incite
further unrest and discontent with the central government.
What new developments and investments that are drawn to-
ward the southern Philippines are typically from large
multinational corporations whose primary goal is to take
advantage of the abundant resources found there.
B.F. Goodrich, Goodyear, and Firestone received 97 percent
of all rubber income produced in the islands in 1981.
Dole and Del Monte were responsible for 99.8 percent of all
pineapple sales in 1970. Between these two companies,
16,400 hectares of land is used, making it the world's
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largest pineapple plantation. The top export in 1979 for
the region was bananas. It was totally controlled by four
corporations; Del Monte, Dole, United Fruit, and Sumitomo.
More than 27,000 hectares of land are currently devoted to
i-i. • 161this crop.
Concessions for these activities are granted through
the central government. These companies are given a rela-
tively free hand in the running and protection of their
investments to include hiring private security. Much of the
work force is imported from the north. Since the taxes paid
by these corporations go to the central government, few
benefits filter down to the local communities.
Multinational activity has drawn some development and
improvement programs to the south, but even these are criti-
cized by the Moros. The most significant of these contro-
versial projects is the construction of a number of dams.
This project will generate electricity and feed new water
channels to the larger corporate farming sites and agri-
business plantations. In the process, however, thousands of
hectares of land now farmed by indigenous people will be
flooded. This alluvial land is the most fertile and pro-
ductive. The dams will reduce the amount of flow downstream
which will adversely affect the traditional farming in the
162
area.
A financially ailing, country must make pragmatic deci-
sions. When it comes down to a decision between the Muslim
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communities and the multinationals, the more financially
profitable has been, and will probably continue to be, the
more popular course of action for the government. These
conditions will worsen relations between the Moros and the
government.
Factionalism among the Moros is one of the biggest and
most significant problems. The Moros have never been a
homogeneous people. Dr. Tan, a Samal, has stated that the
Muslims will never be unified due to the ethnic barrier that
has always existed between their various regional groups.
The only factors which have tied the Moros together have
been their nationality as Filipinos and the religion of
Islam. Their leadership has likewise been fragmented,
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usually following ancestral lines of allegiance. This
has hindered progress, be it either for peace or succession.
Most of the dissident Moro leadership is based outside of
the Philippines and out of touch with the people they claim
to represent. The government cannot effectively negotiate
due to the lack of central representation for the Moros.
Although the Moros cannot launch an effective consolidated
offensive, likewise they cannot control their elements
sufficiently to prevent sporadic skirmishes with the
military.
There are many things that could cause the consolida-
tion of the Moro leadership. One scenario would be an
abrupt deterioration of the already poor conditions in the
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south which could be blamed on the government. In light of
such disintegration, many of the ethnic barriers and poli-
tical rifts currently separating the leadership would be
quickly put aside. Should conditions of this magnitude
come to exist, it is also likely that outside Islamic sup-
port would be increased and consolidated, further strength-
ening their efforts.
Due to the nature of the Islamic faith, many of its
followers commonly defer to other traditional Islamic
countries for advice, education, and leadership. The vari-
ous Moro organizations today are continually petitioning
Islamic countries and organizations for recognition and
support. Should any of these countries or organizations
find it beneficial to their own objectives to support them
it could provide the necessary motivation to unify the
Moros into a more cohesive force. Religion could then be
employed as a justification for their eventual, possibly
violent, actions.
Some Islamic countries have more leverage against the
Philippine government than merely the threat of support for
the insurgents. The nations of the Middle East hold nearly
all the cards when it comes to oil supply. This can be a
persuasive diplomatic tool. Iran has been exercising this
option since 1980, but any slack was easily picked up by
other suppliers. Saudi Arabia supplies 42 percent of the
Philippines oil imports and employs approximately sixty
90
percent of the 500,000 overseas laborers exported as a
natural resource from the islands. In 1982 the country
received 700 to 800 million dollars return on these laborers
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with 1.5 billion dollars projected for 1983. If Saudi
Arabia alone or in concert with other Islamic countries were
to exercise all their options, they could easily inflict
serious damage upon the already ailing Philippine economy.
By supporting the insurgents they could also hurt the
government by causing increased military expenditures and
diplomatic embarrassment.
The unfortunate result of so many divergent interests
focused on the southern Philippines is that it is left with
three parallel structures of authority competing to fill the
government's position.
The first of these structures is the "official" govern-
ment which is dominated by civilians. In the Muslim areas,
the government has been divided into two semi-autonomous
regional governments, one located in Cotabato City, the
other in Zamboanga City, Each has a separate legislative
assembly, executive council and supporting bureaucracy.
This arrangement has provided additional employment and
training through participation, however, its effectiveness
at the administration of "government" programs necessary to
better the living standards and conditions in the south has
left a lot to be desired.
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The second of these structures of authority, the mili-
tary, gained power during martial law. The countryside
still has the appearance of occupied territory due to the
large military presence there. In many portions of the
south, especially those which are isolated and rural, the
military has assumed the additional duties of upholding law
enforcement and the judicial process. Its primary source of
power comes from its control of weapons. Military command-
ers have almost total control because of the weak links
"I fi 7back to the central government.
The third structure of authority operating in the Muslim
areas is composed of the various armed bands claiming
affiliation to one or more of the various insurgent organi-
zations. The most common is the BMA portion of the MNLF.
Due to the Islamic affiliation of these groups there is a
strong motivation for Muslim citizens to adhere to and sup-
1 fi R
port them above the others.
The overall result of these conditions can best be des-
cribed as anarchy. Due to the competitive nature of these
organizations, it is in the best interest of the citizens
to support them only to the extent necessary to prevent
reprisal from them but not enough to cause retaliation from
the other groups. As long as this anarchical situation
continues in the south, so will the unrest and violence.
There is one overriding factor present in the southern
Philippines which will tend to increase the likelihood of
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violent conflict any time a dispute arises which involves
the Moro people. This one single factor is the Islamic
faith. All of the world's major religions profess to ab-
hore violence. The exception is the Muslim faith which not
only justifies violence in its name, but requires it of all
devout believers whenever a jihad is declared or decreed by
the Qur'an. Islam also rewards those who give of themselves
for this holy cause. A martyr who dies in the quest of
Jihad is assured of a speedy entry into Heaven with no un-
pleasant stops in Hell due to possible misdeeds during
one's lifetimes.
In Article III, Section 4, of the Constitution and
Bylaws of the Muslim Independence Movement there is direct
evidence of the call to Jihad for the Moro ' s cause. It
declared that "it is the duty and obligation of every Muslim
to wage Jihad, physically and spiritually to change Darul
Aman (the present status of the Muslim communities) to
Darul Islam (Islamic territory) and prevent it from becoming
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Darul Harb (hostile territory to the Muslims)."
Jihad is, however, only one facet of the Islamic reli-
gion. The Filipino Muslims are currently undergoing a
period of growing awareness of Islam. Some feel this is the
170primary cause of unrest among the Moro people. The
increased awareness has manifested itself in several ways.
Notably among the Moro elite there is an Islamic fundamen-
talist movement that will, at least for the present time,
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assure some degree of continued support from external
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sources. This increased consciousness will cause a
heightened sense of duty to jihad, which will sharpen the
contrast between north and south. One of the primary
vehicles for the fundamentalist movement has been the
madrassa
,
an Islamic school usually connected to a specific
mosque. They are frequently staffed by teachers who have
trained in Islamic educational centers in the Middle East.
The curriculum always includes instruction in the Arabic
reading of the Qur'an, the performance of Islamic ritual,
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and the basic principles of Islam.
Due to the lack of emphasis on any subject other than
Islam, there is a tendency for this to lead to unrest and
militancy towards the government. Many Muslims realize,
however, that "the children need more than religion to
173better their lives and survive in a modern world."
Another factor present in Islam which tends to lead to
conflict is the Islamic requirement for no separation be-
tween church and state. In the words of Cesar Majul:
It is inconsistent and not canonically possible for
an individual to claim that he can still be a Muslim
and not advocate the existence of a Muslim community
...Moreover, Allah has commanded the believers to act
as a community or as a nation... It has been clearly
demonstrated that no one can be a good Muslim unless
he works for the unity and cohesion of the Muslim
-17 4
community as well as its social well-being. x '
*
To act as an Islamic community, Moros feel that they require
complete freedom to practice their divinely prescribed faith-
ideology along with its doctrines, customs, and laws.
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The presence of so many Christian military is perceived
as a challenge to this principle of self-government by
forcibly imposing Christian government rule upon the Moro
people.
As long as the Moros have their religion to justify
their actions as well as give them a sense of brotherhood
among all Muslims and separation from the other Filipinos,
there will be tension and violence in their regions of the
Philippines
.
When dealing with Southeast Asia in general and the
Philippines in particular, regionalism is a factor which
must be kept in mind. Regional identity and ancestral
background will determine native language and possibly
political allegiance. Unfortunately, the government has,
on occasion, forgotten this basic factor when dealing with
the Moros. After giving aid to one Muslim ethnic group, the
government has taken credit for aiding all Muslims. This
has served only to deepen ethnic barriers between the Muslim
groups and widen the gulf between Muslims and the
. 175government.
Much to the Moros detriment, a cultural stereotype has
developed. Phrases such as "You can't trust a Moro," "They
will just as soon kill you as look at you," and "The only
good Moro is a dead Moro" are examples of negative phrases
1 7 fi
and sentiments that are occasionally evident.
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Another serious misperception by Filipinos when dealing
with Moros is the idea of assimilation. This specific
problem stems from a more general one that is evident
worldwide. A majority is often times willing to welcome a
minority into its ranks on the unspoken condition that the
minority changes so that it is no longer distinguishable
from the majority. The majority many times feels it neces-
sary to offer integration as the road to a "better life"
for the minority group. All too often, however, the
minority does not share this view. The integration of the
Moros into Filipino society, long a goal of the central
government, seems to follow this line. The Moro people see
integration as assimilation with an ensuing loss of reli-
177gious and ethnic identity.
Misperceptions and misundertandings of the Moro people
have been a problem ever since the time of the Spanish. In
an effort to increase its understanding of the Philippine
Muslims the Southern Philippines Development Authority
(SPDA) commissioned a two-million peso study to aid in
development planning. A second study was commissioned to
help solve implementation problems with projects already in
progress. Both studies were halted and it was assumed by
some that the government thought it knew enough and did not
wish to know more.
An example of this lack of understanding was on the
occasion of Mrs. Marcos' birthday in 1981. As head of the
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SPDA she invited members to celebrate her birthday on
Leyte. There were, of course, a number of Muslims in atten-
dance. Souvenirs were given to the guests to include a
small statue of the Santa Nino (clad in red velvet) en-
graved with "Ferdinand Romualdez Marcos II." Another
example of misunderstanding was when Malacanang invited a
group of visiting Muslim officials to lunch during
Ramadhan. To many Muslims these were more indications of
17 8the lack of sensitivity to religious differences.
As long as the central government continues to display
insensitivity and a lack of understanding of the Moros,
there is bound to be unrest and insurgency in the south.
B. FACTORS FAVORING PEACE
There are many factors which favor the increase of
stability and peace in the Muslim areas of the Philippines.
The reversal of any of the negative factors, which have
already been covered, would greatly enhance the conditions
which currently prevail. Many of the negative factors also
have positive aspects to them. Some of these will be
covered in this section.
An example of one such double ended factor is the infra-
structure development programs within the south. Although
many of these projects may have had adverse effects during
implementation, most will, at least superficially, benefit
the community upon completion. Road development may destroy
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ancestral lands but, when complete, is available for all to
use. The construction of dams has also caused a large
amount of tension due to flooding, however, when complete,
the electricity will benefit the rural communities and per-
haps the effects of drought may be lessened. Unfortunately,
many of these projects have been seriously eroded and some
cancelled due to the current state of the economy.
The government has found that it is politically advan-
tageous and economically expedient to fund the building of
Islamic mosques. For a relatively small expenditure, a
large amount of goodwill is fostered within portions of the
Muslim communities. This type of aid is specific and sensi-
tive to the Moro people and therefore counteracts the pre-
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vailing negative image of the government. Furthermore,
Marcos has resorted to outright bribery to woo some dis-
satisfied Moros away from their fellow religionists.
Another method used by the government to gain acceptance
by the Muslims was the modification of national laws in
18
recognition of religious differences. Actually this was
a no lossiv-multiple gain decision by the government. It is
difficult and expensive to enforce the law in the south and
it was apparent that the laws forbidding multiple wives and
divorce were unenforceable. Exemptions from these laws,
which were contrary to Islamic doctrine, were intended to
exemplify the government's sensitivity to and acceptance of
the Muslim faith. A similar decision was the legalizing of
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Muslim holidays in the south. This helped offset the
negative factor of the many Christian holidays observed
throughout the Philippines.
The form of government has changed radically within the
south. Local officials are elected by the populace and
fill most positions at this level. Many Muslims hold posi-
tions now, but so do many Christians due to their large
population in the south. Muslims can no longer argue that
they have no part in the government which controls them.
Whatever the level of participation by Muslims, each elec-
tion or appointment is recognition of them as a people by
the government.
The two semi-autonomous regional governments now opera-
ting in Muslim areas are proof that the government at least
partially adhered to the Tripoli Agreements. The rationale
used at the negotiations for two rather than one regional
structure was an additional advantage for the government.
It argued that:
Two regional legislative assemblies and two executive
councils (one per region) will enable more Muslims to
participate in the administration of government affairs
and train them in leadership. Leadership and admini-
strative skills are what most of the Muslim youth need
now. 1^1
The old adage of "divide and conquer" might apply as an
ulterior motive for this dual arrangement. It would be
virtually impossible for the Muslims to form a united front
within this structure.
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Education has become a focal point for the government.
In an attempt to draw the Muslim youth away from the
madrassa, it has funded the building and staffing of schools,
The curriculum is designed to better prepare Muslim youth
for survival in the modern world and to better cope with
world situations. This is a no risk venture for the govern-
ment since attendance is not mandatory and some community
development is observed by the Muslims.
Although the south remains a military stronghold, there
have been some short term improvements within the Muslim
areas. The most notable difference is the reduced number of
military troops stationed there. This is due to increased
communist NPA activities in the eastern regions of Mindanao
which have drawn the military away from the Muslim communi-
ties. As late as 1981 there were twelve battalions in the
southern Philippines to suppress the insurgencies. Now
there are six battalions, approximately 3,500 Army and
Marine troops, being used primarily to suppress the commu-
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nist insurgency in the eastern portions of Mindanao.
The military has also increased discipline among the
military in the south, replacing lax commanders and holding
civil rights offenders accountable for their misdeeds. This
has not completely eradicated atrocities but they have been
A A 183reduced.
The turmoil provoked by Christian troops in Muslim
areas has diminished somewhat but this is seen as only a
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short term benefit. Confidence in the government and its
troops has not significantly improved.
The factionalism of the Moro insurgent leadership is an
example of a factor which has both benefitted and hindered
the government. One benefit is the lack of a unified
opposition to the government by the insurgents. There is
some feeling that some of the factionalism has been fos-
tered by the government in the hope that this might afford
some small amount of control. The physical separation of
the insurgent leadership from its followers has additionally
contributed to the factionalism and disunity of the Moro
cause. The ethnic barriers within the Moro culture are also
a prime factor preventing the unified leadership of the
Muslims of the Philippines. As long as the government can
face a factionalized people and insurgency it is assured of
a weak opponent.
In an effort to reduce the potential number of rebels
in the south, the government has instigated various incen-
tive programs which have been at least partially successful.
These programs typically involve amnesty, food, clothing,
shelter, concessions, or government positions and jobs.
Exact figures on the funds allocated and expended or types
of programs are not available. Some figures of question-
able accuracy, recently attributed to Simeon Datumanong,
head of the regional government in central Mindanao, will
at least give a rough estimate as to the government's
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interests and involvement in these programs. He claimed
that surrendering rebels were given free food and clothing
for three months and houses costing $2,500,00. He said
that this program has already expended $1. 25 million on the
rehabilitation of former rebels. There was also a program
designed to resettle and rehabilitate an estimated eight
million people affected by the conflict. These incentive
programs are at least partially responsible for the decrease
in armed Muslim rebels from 30,000 to approximately
18515,000. It is questionable as to how long the govern-
ment can continue such an expensive method of nullifying its
opponents given the current economic crisis.
The current world situation has benefitted the central
government vis-a-vis the Muslim insurgents. The Islamic
Conference still supports the MNLF, but it does not condone
radical support as have individual Islamic countries in the
past. There is no substantial evidence that the insurgent
groups are receiving direct aid such as terrorism training,
weapons supply, or military advisors as it did in the past.
Islamic countries which have endorsed the various Moro
insurgent groups and have been prone to such support are
currently involved in their own struggles which are proving
costly. Examples are Iran's preoccupation with its war
with Iraq, Syria's conflict with Lebanon and Israel, and
Libya's excursions into Chad. This may be a long or a
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short term benefit to the government, but either way the
government has no control over it.
The Moros do not have a monopoly on insurgency in the
Philippines. Today (1984) a major portion of the AFP is
occupied in an attempt to subdue the New People's Army
(NPA) , the military wing of the outlawed Communist Party of
the Philippines (CPP) . It has been estimated that the
Communists may influence as much as forty percent of the
area outside the major urban population centers to some
18 6degree. In May of 1984, President Marcos put the number
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of Communist guerrillas in the NPA at 6,810. James
Kelley, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, however, cites the guerrilla
18 8
strength at about 10,000, while the CPP places it at
189
about 20,000.
The NPA was born with the merger of the CPP. student/
intellectual leadership and an armed remnant of the Huks.
In 1969 they started with only a few hundred guerrillas
but grew to several thousand in the early 1970s when they
190
suffered devastating losses in battle with the AFP. The
growing Moro insurgency caused the diversion of the AFP
forces which allowed for the recuperation of the surviving
NPA to the strength that it is today. In the early 1970s
the NPA operated in 10 to 2 man armed units. As of June
1984, 200 to 300 man operations were becoming more
. . 191frequent.
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The NPA forces have expanded beyond the traditional Huk
areas in Luzon and by July 1984 were active in 62 of the
192Philippine 's 73 provinces. The rich natural resources
and deep-water ports of Mindanao make it important both
economically and militarily. Philippine Defense Minister
Juan Ponce Enrile has acknowledged that Mindanao is the
region in which the NPA problem has intensified the most,
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citing at least 16 guerrilla fronts. The area in the
vicinity of Davao in eastern Mindanao has become one of the
primary hot-beds of NPA activity, and more activities have
194
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spread their ripples all over Moroland.
The common people in communist areas are continually
faced with the dilemma of whom to support. Many areas are
patrolled by the AFP during daylight, but are controlled
by the NPA at night. Either side will severely punish
those who are suspected of cooperating' with or supporting
the other. The Moros are caught in the middle between the
military and the NPA.
There are important differences between the NPA and the
AFP in the way that they are perceived by the people with
whom they have direct contact. The AFP tends to treat the
local populace as if they were the enemy, not the subject
of protection from hostile forces. The NPA has gone to
great lengths to convey the "Robin Hood" image, acting as
protectors and attempting to identify the people's inter-
ests with their own.
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The NPA uses violence to achieve specific political
objectives. They target selectively, many times killing
mayors who resist the NPA in the takeover of their small
towns and citizens who speak out against them. Although
this is crass terrorism, it is not difficult to understand
in advance who will be targeted and how to stay out of
trouble with the NPA. Small farmers know that if they main-
tain a low profile, appear to cooperate with the guerrillas,
hand over relatively small amounts of food and money that
are demanded, and remain silent about NPA killings in their
195
villages, they have little to fear. When mounting a
military action, the NPA strives for overwhelming firepower
against the defending government forces. This tactic maxi-
mizes their chances for success and creates- the image of
power in the minds of the people. The NPA has probably
killed many more civilians than has the military over the
period from 198 to 1985, however, the military is still
more feared due to the systematic violence used by the NPA
versus the seemly random violence used by the AFP.
The AFP has the image of using indiscriminate violence
without regard for the political consequences. They have
the reputation of beating a community into submission if it
196
is suspected of sympathizing with and harboring the NPA. .
As the NPA has grown in size and activity, so has its
need for ever-increasing funds. Mining and logging com-
panies pay "revolutionary taxes" of up to $5,000,00 per
105
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month to the NPA in return for "protection." Most all
of the large multinational corporations operating in the
Philippines need large and expensive machinery which is
difficult to protect. The alternative to the revolutionary
taxes is the targeting and destruction of this machinery.
Some military commanders have implied that some
Catholic priests and nuns in Moro country are in collusion
with the CPP/NPA. This is partly a result of the activi-
ties of some clergy who have become particularly outspoken
and active in opposition to the government. Ever since the
Aquino assassination, the government's charge of "inappro-
priate clerical activity" has become more frequent and
198
strongly worded.
There is also a large movement within the Catholic
Church in the Philippines advocating the formation of
Basic Christian Communities (BCC) . They are a form of
social organization which emphasizes local authority and
individual decision-making partially in response to the
lack of these virtues in the outlying communities. The
BCC doctrine seems similar to those advocated by the NPA
and have therefore been linked together by the military and
199the government.
Due to the ideology of CPP/NPA doctrine, it does not
seem likely that the Moros will ever officially support the
CPP. Any support from the Islamic Conference or other
sympathetic Muslim countries would likely be lost if a
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formal union between the two groups was ever made. That
does not rule out the possibility of local informal agree-
ments to prevent conflict between BMA and NPA field units.
The NPA, however, would welcome an alliance with the
Muslims, as long as it would further the NPA cause. A
Filipino communist spokesman who indicated that the NPA
could offer the MNLF advice in building better political
structures suggested that in return the MNLF assist them
in obtaining weapons because "the Moros have centuries of
experience in smuggling weapons." The National
Democratic Front (NDF) was established by the CPP on April
24, 1973 as a front organization for the outlawed party.
It now functions as a de facto government in many of the
areas where guerrilla fronts have been well established;
collecting taxes, implementing land reform programs,
organizing public works and schools, and administering a
revolutionary justice system. The NDF's founding document
made it clear as to their attitude about the Muslims in
the south:
We salute the Moro people and those leading them
in a resolute armed struggle for national self-
determination. So long as they are confronted with
a regime as oppressive as that of the U.S. -Marcos
dictatorship, they are completely correct in going
to the length of fighting for secession.
We are prepared to develop further relations with
the Moro National Liberation Front, the Bangsa Moro
Army and other organizations. They have all the
right to fight the imperialists and their puppets for
grabbing their lands and other resources and for
exploiting the people. 201
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The chairman of the CPP, Amado Guerreno, stated that
"the CPP and the MNLF are bound by similar goals and by the
need to struggle against a common enemy. So there is a
wide basis for their unity, cooperation, and coordina-
202tion." The old personal ties between the CPP and the
MNLF should not be overlooked. Misuari and Guerreno both
attended the University of the Philippines together and
were both active in the KM youth organization.
There are also those who feel that an agreement has
already been reached. Major General Delfin Castro is in
charge of anti-guerrilla operations and has led the
Zamboanga City based southern command since 1981. Recently
Castro said he believed that the NPA and MNLF have joined
203forces. Other military commanders do not maintain the
same opinion. Presently the Moros and the NPA are fighting
a common foe, however, should either encroach upon the
others territory without permission turbulence would likely
ensue.
C. AMERICAN INTERESTS IN THE MINDANAO SITUATION
American national interest in the Philippines has
diplomatic, economic, and strategic implications. Official
ties with the United States were formed and cemented during
the American period. Economically the Philippines trades
heavily with the U.S. and there is a preponderance of
American firms entrenched throughout. Strategically, the
archipelago's geographic location places it at the Pacific
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entrance to the Indian Ocean and along the sea lines of
communication (sloes) between East and South Asia. This is
a prime location for American sea and air bases. Anything
which would threaten U.S. personnel and installations with-
in the Philippines would jeopardize U.S. national interest.
The future of war and peace in Mindanao is of immense
interest to the United States. It is entirely possible that
both the Moros and the Filipinos in Mindanao will find
further cause for anti-American acts and attitudes if they
experience greater displeasure in the policies of the U.S.
towards the Philippines under the contemporary Marcos
regime.
Recently there has been a marked increase in Philippine
nationalism which is more Filipino than Moro. This intense
pride in nation and heritage has fostered anti-American
feeling which is, however, shared by some Moros due to the
American record in Moroland. The lingering resentment over
the American colonial period is exacerbated by the contin-
uing U.S. presence, primarily military and multinational.
English is still the primary language used in commerce
and politics. Newspapers, television, radio, and even
government statistics are in English, even though the of-
ficial national language is Pilipino-
From the viewpoint of the Moros, much of their anti-
American emphasis will be linked to their need for weapons
and ammunition and its effect on the success of their
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revolution. A large majority of the weapons within the
Philippines are of U.S. manufacture. Likewise, a vast
majority of the weapons used by the Moros are also American
made. There are large weapons and ammunition storage
facilities at Subic and Clark. There are also likely to
be weapons and ammunition transported between these facili-
ties on open roads making them vulnerable to attack and
seizure. The Moros want weapons wherever they can get them,
and will look for help wherever they can find it. Since
both the Muslims and the NPA desperately need weapons, any
American source of weapons is bound to be their primary
target.
Some anti-government groups feel that the United
States is aiding and abetting their enemy, the Marcos
administration. Funds and military sales from the United
States are, in fact, the primary support for the AFP. In
1982 the estimated defense expenditure by the government of
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the Philippines was $877.76 million. The U.S. bases
agreement package was signed in May 1983 and covered by
compensation for the use of the bases for the period of
1984 through 1989. The amount was set at $900 million, an
increase of 80 percent. Of this amount, outright military
grants were increased from the $50 million to $175 million
and military sales credits were boosted from $250 million
to $300 million. 205
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In an MNLF newsletter it was stated that:
The weaponry obtained by the Philippines under
the assistance program has been responsible for arming
the Marcos military in its genocidal war against the
Bangsamoro people....
This is one of the reasons why the Muslim people
in the Southern Philippines have taken an anti-
American position.... ^
,
In testimony before the U.S. House Sub-Committee on
International Organizations-, the statement was made that the
Mulsims "know that practically all the arms of the
Philippine military forces have been supplied by the U.S.
,,207government.
The omni-present military in the south, brandishing
American weapons and commanded by officers trained to some
degree by the United States, is a constant reminder of the
American support for the central government. Although no
concerted direct action has been taken against American
concerns to date, the real possibility of threat exists and
must be considered when planning for future American involve-
ment in the area.
The greatest threat of violence against American person-
nel and facilities comes from the Moro connection with
countries which have already demonstrated an anti-American
posture. Countries such as Syria, Iran, and Lybia are
prime examples. Iranians in the Philippines have tried to
mobilize the Moros in support of their own revolutionary
goals with limited success. Actions promoted by these
111
groups have resulted in protest marches against the U.S.
208Embassy and distribution of anti-U.S. literature. The
primary obstacle to Iranian involvement is the fact that
Iranians are Shi'ite Muslims while most Moros are of the
Sunni sect. Further Iranian involvement should not be
discounted, however, since religious differences could be
put aside should there be sufficient motivation.
Another stumbling block to the U.S. vis-a-vis the Moros
is its support of Israel. Like Japan, Korea, and Indonesia,
many people in the Philippines feel that the U.S. is too
pro-Israel and they resent its pro-Israel policies.
There is a potential non-violent threat to U.S. national
interest, both in the Philippines and worldwide. This
threat is from the Muslims in the south and their connection
with the Middle East oil suppliers. This influence could be
used to gain leverage against the United States. The MNLF
has already gained the support of Iran in the curtailment
of oil exports to the Philippines. Saudi Arabia has proven
that it will use this option in the momentary suspension of
209its oil supply to the Philippines in 198 0. Should the
Middle East oil suppliers find it within their national
interest to use leverage against the United States in sup-
port of the Islamic independence movement in the southern
Philippines, it would be difficult to find an American
alternative. Although it does not seem likely that the
112
Moros would or could exercise this option at present, it




The struggle of the Moro people in the southern
Philippines against the central government is as old as
their existence. Much of this has been aggravated by the
lack of honest efforts on the part of the majority ruling
parties to come to know the people, their customs, and
their religion. Although the Marcos regime has been no
better than its predecessors, a way must nevertheless be
found to reduce the severity of the struggle and to discover
a path to peaceful coexistence.
There is, however, confusion as to what the future might
hold for the Moro people and for the Filipinos who maintain
homes in the south. With the intrusion of the NPA into the
Muslim problems, the prospects for continued violence out-
weigh the prospects for peace.
It does not seem likely, or even probable, that the U.S.
national interests will be threatened by the Moros apart
from the NPA, but American interests in the southern
Philippines are threatened as long as the quasi war exists.
It is decidedly in the American interest that the conflict
be brought to an end.
The Moro people are not demanding anything which they
do not feel was theirs originally. They want to pursue their
religious faith in their own way. They only wish to reside
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peacefully on their ancestral lands and to be left alone to
work out their own problems with the Filipinos, the govern-
ment, the military and the NPA. Unfortunately, the march
of time and "progress" has not allowed their plea, leaving
only the possibility of continued violence in the future.
It is not an American responsibility to decide whether the
Moros will fade into the social background; or whether there
shall be local autonomy; or whether they will find stronger
means to fight for their rights. It is elemental that as
long as the U.S. depends upon the Philippines as an ally in
Southeast Asia, it wants an ally whose social fabric is as
free as possible from flaws and blemishes.
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